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SYNOPSIS

The Australian economy in the post second world war period
heralded a golden age of expansion with the returned servicemen
assured of jobs.

The employment was based upon a historically

sound agriculture culture with markets for wool and grain
available in a hungry world and the potentially Insatiable demand
of the Japanese Industry for coal and Iron ore.

Labour shortages

which threatened the rate of expansion were eased by a favourable
immigration policy.

This policy sought to provide skilled labour

for Industry and a potential local demand for domestic products.

Government investment in capital programmes such as the Snowy
Mountain scheme could take a high proportion of service skilled
labour and at the same time open up areas for the development of
satellite industrial areas to decentralise Industry.

The success of the policies cannot be denied but fundamentally the
system relied too heavily upon raw materials to the exclusion of a
need to develop a sound manufacturing basis capable of exploiting
indigenous reserves.

Technology was only advanced on a "needs

must" basis with little thought to the future where the high
living standard enjoyed could only be maintained by a higher gross
domestic product capacity than that existing.

The thesis is concerned with the growth of an originally all
Australian owned coal mining organisation which sought to
diversify its Interest by entering the fabrication and mining
machinery industry both in Australia and in the open market
overseas.

Success of the parent company attracted overseas Investors in the
first phase of takeover bids in Australia in the early 1960's and
the company eventually became a wholly owned subsidiary of an
International raining group.

The role of industrial dispute as the basis for the decline of the
metal manufacturing company has been examined.

The thesis also examines the managerial skills in reviving Kidston
gold mine.

The mine was considered previously to be an

unattractive proposition and uneconomic.

The project was

re-examined, revealing that the rejection was based upon
managerial inflexibility and traditionally over-conservative
methods of mine evaluation, construction, operation projected
commodity prices and contingency factors.

A fresh alternative

to the traditional approach was examined and today the project is
a recognised success within the Australian Mining Industry.

The Kidston project has demonstrated the need to maximise upon
capital investment, by reviewing profit margin as the basis for
financing Australia's or indeed any resource rich nation in
developing a sound economy.

CHAPTER 1

1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION - Understanding Marketing Management

1.1

Introduction

Marketing as a skill was developed in Australia after the end
of W o r l d W a r II and received a boost of necessity after the
entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common
Market.

T h e emergence of Japan as a major manufacturing and

export b a s e country came at the same period w h e n the
Australian coal mining and iron ore industries w e r e
favourably placed geographically to exploit the market
potential of the fast developing Japanese Steel Industry.

T h e period between 1955 and 1961 saw the emergence of
Australian entrepreneurial management and marketing
specialists who realised that the readily accessible reserves
of coal and iron ore in Queensland, N.S.W. and Western
Australia offered a stable source of raw materials to J a p a n
co-incident w i t h a major expansion of the BHP steel
manufacturing industry.

This period witnessed a major

growth in capital investment in Australia w i t h a demand for
labour w h i c h could only be supplied by large scale
immigration.

T h e Calwell Government in 1949 introduced the subsidised ten
pound fare scheme available to British immigrants on an o p e n
door basis (subject to specific qualifying conditions) and to
European migrants of whom the majority came from Italy,
G e r m a n y , Greece and Yugoslavia.

These migrants were v e r y

quickly placed in industry in N.S.W., Victoria and to a
lesser e x t e n t , in Queensland and other s t a t e s .

1954 saw a

massive increase of migrant intake from European migrants
over the first four years of some 22% (N.S.W. Bureau of
Statistics, 1955)

3 0009 02870 4216

The period between 1954 and 1961 created a new class of
society in Australia based aroimd the capital cities of
N.S.W. and Victoria whose lifestyle depended on
manufacturing, steel, and mining which now rivalled the
traditional agricultural industry as a market leader.

The Japanese car industry, ship building industry and to a
lesser extent, the electrical Industry, re-organised during
this time and a pattern of dynamic marketing, by the car
industry in particular, marked a penetration of world markets
in 1960 with small fuel efficient cars designed to meet the
rising fuel costs in the aftermath of the Suez crisis.

Marketing in Australia was on an ad hoc basis with an
expanding export market for minerals and for agricultural
products which appeared to be insatiable.

The home market

boosted by wage increases, easily won by unions, was equally
demanding for household goods, housing and consumer items.
This was due to the influx of migrants with families and by
the new generation of Australians now emerging from the
return of the armed forces at the end of World War II.

This era marked the commencement of the "fat cat" philosophy
adopted by management and employees when Australia would now
prosper on a presumably never ending favourable mineral
export market.

The Japanese heavy industry based on modern

high productivity blast furnaces created an insatiable demand
for metallurgical coke and Australia was a potential source
for such a supply.

Table 1.1 shows the details of the

Australian coal export to overseas markets between 1950 and
1959.
Japan.

Note the dramatic increase in export of coal to
(J.C.B. 1960).

Table 1.1
Export of Black Coal from Australia

NSW (tonnes 000)

1950

1951

New Caledonia
Fiji
N.Z. & Pacific Islds
Japan
Korea
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Argentina

51
9
1

77
18
3

Total N.S.W.

61

98

1950

1951

QLD. (tonnes 000)

Japan
Hong Kong
Korea
Argentina
Pakistan
S. Vietnam
i
i
1 Total Queensland

; Total Australia

(1950-1959)

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

129
20
4

138
23
4
55
125

163
22
4

168
18
9
9
7
2

157
17
14
27
61
2

182
11
14
451
85
6
7

143
12
1
362
162
5

145
12

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

8

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

169

-

-

-

493
22
7
-

Ill

84

153

353

358

213

278

756

796

763

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

5
15

_

_

-

-

-

-

-

-

_

_

-

-

-

-

-

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

10

-

49

8

-

-

-

-

13

19

202

361

809

782

-

61

-

98

29

358

9

213

278

768

-

10

The manufacturing of the raw material products was based upon
buyer's need and Japan became a lucrative market for coal
producers w h e r e the acquisition of coal contracts was easily
obtained if the supplier in Australia could satisfy the
customer of continuity of supply to the docks.

Coal prices

w e r e negotiated at a most acceptable level to the producers
with escalation clauses included for Consumer Price Index
awards to industry and in addition the contracts provided
incentives for the colliery companies to invest in capital
equipment to increase output in existing mines or to develop
new m i n e s .

In the period 1960/1961, the capital cost to

develop a new mine in the Southern coalfield of N.S.W. was
$12 M i l l i o n , for a mine designed to produce 4,500 tonnes of
raw coal per day.

A typical lease area had reserves of plus

50,000,000 tonnes of coal.

However the basic cost to

operate a mine in the Southern coalfield was as follows:-

Labour

2.85

Materials

1.10

Stores

1.08

Power

0.29

Insurance

0.15

Royalty etc.

0.25

Capital

2.50

Washing

0.80

Additional charge

Sub total

$ 8.97

Transport to port

$11.20

Port charges

$ 8.97

T o t a l cost/tonne F.O.B.

$20.17

Saleable cost/tonne F.O.B.

$28.00-$30.00/tonne dry
clean coal

Profit

$ 8.00-$10.00/tonne.

This cost was based upon an output per man shift of some
8.5 to 9.00 tonnes.

The capital value of a typical operating mine at this time
was some $12,000,000 with leases of coal in excess of
60,000,000 tonnes on average for a single mine.

With a potential selling price of $28/30 per tonne this
represented a 100% tax paid return of investment of 15% at a
period where housing loans were at 4.8 to 5.0%. This position
was that existing at the start of the introduction of
continuous miners capable of cutting and loading at a rate of
500 tonnes per hour, complemented by shuttle cars with a
capacity of 8-10 tonnes.

Mining leases were quickly granted by the N.S.W. and
Queensland State Governments anxious to attract capital to
develop the extensive coal resources available and also to
help develop infrastructure at the shipping export ports.
These States, in addition waived local rules to attract
ancillary industries to the major population areas.
Australia's small businesses in the form of back yard
workshops responded to a demand for the supply of service
items associated with the coal mining industry producing
facsimile spares for imported equipment or in competition
with local manufacturers who had invested in research and
development of mining equipment.

1.2

Effects of Increased Capita1 Expenditure and the
Development of New Mines, Mamifacturing Industries

The intensive mechanisation of the coal mining industry,
coupled with re-construction of existing mines and
development of new mines, resulted in a demand for an
Australian share of the capital equipment manufacturing
industry.

Such capital equipment was of overseas design and

required the minimum of local design and the overseas
suppliers quickly established local agencies to market the
equipment or set up an Australian branch of the parent
company with minimum manufacturing facilities.

Marketing comprised the review of clients' requirements
without specification changes and allocation on a limited
delivery basis so great was the demand.

This, in the period

1960-87, has produced a very erratic marketing system in
Australia.

To most Australian businessmen the words 'stars', 'cows', and
'dogs' mean nothing at all as commercial terms, but according
to Davenport (1983), these are the words that every chief
executive should be thinking as he plans the company's growth
over the next four years - (in 1987 this is so relevant in
the coal mining and metal manufacturing industry).

The above words are those used by the U.S. based corporate
strategy group, Boston Consulting Group (BCG), to sort out a
company's good performing areas.

Davenport refers to the BCG report on Morien where a sales
chart is divided into four parts:

1.

The stars, i.e. the good sales growth, large market
share.

2.

Wildcats, good sales growth small market share.

3.

Cash cows, poor sales growth, small market share.

Such was the demand for equipment that a solid background of
suppliers of imported and locally manufactured capital goods
evolved where each of the four conditions described could
exist in harmony, in particular 1960-70.

In typical Australian fashion alternative local sources
evolved for the supply of service items and facsimile spares
for the imported equipment.

The coal mining industry in particular spawned the growth of
small engineering/manufacturing
supply of spare parts produced

industries dedicated to the
from drawings largely supplied

by the colliery company maintenance engineers either by
measurement or from spare part manuals.

As these small

companies were usually managed and owned by entrepreneurial
tradesmen "having a go" there was a continual growth and
decline of businesses destroyed by cut throat competition,
creating the terms stars, wildcats etc.

To meet the demands in the service industry field the small
entrepeneur would pay over award rates, hidden bonus
(overtime guarantees) and in exchange labour would accept sub
standard conditions.

Only three major overseas suppliers of continuous miners
encouraged the Australian manufacture of continuous miners
initially in the late 1970's, followed by a fourth in 1980.
The designs were mainly overseas with Australian design input
relating only to modification to suit local conditions,
(Tague, 1966).

(Research and Development expenditure to suit

local needs).

Although the ventures were initially successful, the impact
of the 35 hour week and metal unions wage increases of
1980-81 brought about the failure to compete in price with
the overseas units and all have now reverted to mainly
overseas importation.

It is noteworthy that in the

Australian manufacturing period the only development money
spent on the equipment was for minor improvement.

It is of interest to note that the see-saw principle of
Product Petrification as reported in Californian Management
Review (1982) began in 1982 where the four manufacturers of
continuous miners in Australia won and lost orders for the
supply of equipment to the same client due to the lack of any
real major development by any one group.

The only change of

rate was in the introduction of solid state electrical
control gear which initially was imported.

Since 1982 the see-saw principle has applied in the industry,
for example in the case of continuous miners the following
has occurred (Knowles, 1982):

Fox - Marietta

-

Developed local unit 1980 - sold 50
units 1980-85 - now fully imported

Joy - JCM

-

Manufactured under licence 1981-86 sold 200 units - now fully imported

Jeffrey Heliminer

-

Manufactured under licence 1982-86 sold 78 units - now fully imported

Noyes Miner

-

Part manufacture 1978-86 - 60 units
sold - reverting to import.

1.3

Fluctuating Research and Development (R & D) Budgets

Australian expenditure on industrial research and development
declined during the 1970's from approximately 1.2 per cent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1973-74, to about one per
cent in 1976-77, and is now probably somewhat less than one
per cent of GDP.

Thus, approximately $1 billion is spent

annually, with governments providing about 60 per cent of the
funds, and undertaking in their own agencies approximately 40
per cent (in terms of expenditure) of the overall national
& D effort.

R

In the early 1970*s, some 4,500 technical people were
employed in industry in R & D.

Towards the end of the

decade fewer than 3000 people were similarly employed.

It

seems that few manufacturing firms have concerted research
programmes, and that most of these firms engaging in R & D
are overseas-controlled although it may have been expected,
perhaps, that these companies would have had greater access
to foreign R & D .

It may be that much of the R & D

carried

out in Australia consists of modifying foreign developments
for the local market.

The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (CSIRO) is a statutory body, established in
1949,

It is the largest research organisation in Australia,

with an annual budget of approximately $200 million.

Much

of its research effort focuses on aspects of primary
industry, although increasing attention is being devoted to
areas of secondary industry.

The Australian Government has various incentive schemes to
encourage R & D , including the Industrial R & D Grants scheme
which dispensed $24 million to industry in 1978-79.
Payments of 50 per cent of project costs, up to a maximum of
$500 000 per annum per company, are made to approved firms.

Most of today's research is carried out by scientific teams
working in research laboratories rather than by independent
inventors of the breed of Thomas Edison, Samuel Morse or
Alexander Graham Bell.
special challenges.
much cost control.

Managing scientific personnel poses

They are professionals who resent too
They are more interested in solving

scientific problems than in coming up with marketable
products.

Yet companies are making some progress in

impressing a stronger marketing orientation in their
scientific personnel.

Tight money in recent years has led many companies to
concentrate more on pursuing minor product improvements
rather than gambling on major innovations.

In the past,

such major foreign companies as Du Pont, Bell Laboratories
and Pfizer would invest heavily to find major breakthroughs
and were successful in many cases.

Even these companies

seem to be pursuing more modest goals today.

Most companies

are content to put their money into improving antiperspirant
deodorants, car restyling and new soft drink flavours.

Some

part of every R & D budget is spent simply to match or copy
competitors' products rather than striving to surpass them.

1.4

Increased Regulation of Technological Change

Technological change is encountering more regulation and
opposition than ever before.

As products get more complex,

the public needs assurance of their safety and health.
Government agencies have responded by expanding their power
to investigate and ban new products that might be directly
harmful or have questionable side effects.

Thus the

Australian Federal Department of Health has issued elaborate
regulations governing the scientific testing of new drugs,
resulting in
(1) much higher research costs;
(2) lengthening the time between idea and introduction and
(3) driving much drug research to other parts of the world
where regulations are less stringent.
Safety and health regulations have substantially increased in
other areas such as food, motor vehicles, clothing,
electrical appliances and construction.

Marketers must know

these regulations and take them seriously when proposing,
developing and launching new products.

Many U.S. companies,

such as the marketers of cyclamate sweeteners, have had the
experience of spending millions to find and launch a new
product only to have a government agency pronounce it unsafe
and force its withdrawal from the market.

Technological change is also meeting opposition from
antitechnologists who see large scale technology as
destroying many of the values and aspects of society which
they cherish.

They see technology as threatening to destroy

nature, privacy, jobs, personal contacts, simplicity and even
people themselves.

Some sceptics have adopted Schumacher's

philosophy, that "Small is Beautiful" and have replaced cars
with bicycles, synthetic food with organic food and fancy
clothes with denim clothes.

They have opposed the

construction of new chemical plants, high-rise buildings and
recreational facilities where they believe these threaten to
destroy existing ecological balances.

They have clamoured

for official groups to perform technological assessment on
new technologies before permitting them to be commercialised
in this society.

In September 1987, the Federal Minister for Industry held a
series of discussions with leaders of industry and
educational bodies to examine the role of education in
industry.

Participants from government, industry and

education all agreed that Australia needs some system of
technology assessment and futures studies, but many
participants were sceptical that this could be effectively
incorporated into Australia's existing political system.

Of a list of 20 possible studies for corporate and national
planning in Australia to the year 2000, those ranked as
having top priority were:
Implications of developing relations with South East
Asian countries for Australian economy and society.

Alternative energy supply/demand scenarios for Australia.

Changing world trade relations and structural adjustment
in the Australian economy.

Youth unemployment and socio-economic change in
Australian society.

Technology, productivity and employment in Australian
manufacturing industries.

Growth prospects for the mineral and metal processing
industries in Australia.

Research and development priorities and innovation
opportunities and needs in Australian industry.

Petroleum energy conservation options in transport to
the year 2000.

Alternative economic, social and technological futures
for Australia.

Socio-economic impacts of new computer information and
communication technologies.

Marketers must understand the technological environment and
the nuances of technology.

They must be able to envisage

how technology can be connected with human needs.

They must

work closely with R & D people to encourage a market
orientation to their research.

They must be alert to

possible negative aspects of any innovation that might harm
the users and bring abour distrust and opposition.

1.5

Definition of Problem

The growth of the British Empire was based initially on the
ability of the early colonists to exploit raw materials as a
feed for the factories in the mother country.

An abundance

of coal, water and to a minor extent iron ore coupled with an
expanding industrialised population saw the emergence of the
leading industrial nation of the 19th century.

The

manufacturing industry diversified to supply the expanding
colonies with a nearly captive market and by the beginning of
the 20th century the United Kingdom stood at the same
position in world trade where Australia now stands today.
Allowing for two world wars the indisputable fact is that the
United Kingdom relied too heavily in heavy industry with only
the midlands emerging as the base for new consumer
industries.

The new industries were highly capitalised and

became a vulnerable target for union pressure as well as for
the imposition of old work to rule practices.

Australia, or rather the people must examine the example
given and the role of management and unions needs to be
integrated without the loss of discipline.

A fair day's

work for a fair day's pay is better presented as a fair day's
work can be rewarded by payment such that the worker has a
direct interest in the creation of a reasonable profit margin
which also generates capital for re-investment.

Australia needs a market manager, not only to expand the
sales of existing export earning products mainly raw
materials but to initiate a review of the nations potential
as a producer of goods indirectly associated with base
products and geared to the 21st century.

This is the general problem areas with which this thesis is
concerned.

1.6

Scope of Work

Three projects are presented in order to produce a case for
the above endeavour and to attempt to provide a guide to
management and future managers in order to produce a new
Australia with a balanced economy able to offset the
challenge from resource rich underdeveloped nations.
The case study examples w i l l be restricted to coal and gold
commodities as w e l l as representation of Australian mineral
resources.

The investigation presented would deal with a l l

the major phases of resource development and associated
industries.

CHAPTER

2

15.

MANUFACTURING OF MINING EQUIPMENT IN AUSTRALIA

2.1

Introduction

In 1950 the first continuous miners were introduced into the
Australian deep coal mining industry.

However, agreement

was not reached between the mines, government bodies and the
operators to prevent the extraction of pillars by mechanised
systems mainly continuous miners and shuttle cars.

This was

essential to produce the bulk outputs now required by the
market forces locally and the expanding export market.
After very hard bargaining between unions and employees an
agreement was finally reached which paved the way for the
application of continuous mining methods in 1954 in New South
Wales collieries.

In 1959 some sixty-three percent of coal

was mechanically loaded underground and by 1960 nearly
ninety-four percent of underground coal was loaded by
mechanical loaders.

Conventional pick up loaders and track

mounted coal cutters formed thirty-five percent of the
ninety-four percent value and this was phased out by 1965
when ninety-five percent of all underground coal was loaded
by continuous miners into shuttle cars as shown in Table 2.1.
(JCB, 1960).

Face outputs per shift from continuous miners was on average
one hundred and eighty tonnes in pillars compared with eighty
tonnes previously track mounted from cutters and pick up
loaders.

This increase highlighted the shortcomings of the

track mounted car systems used to convey the coal from the
face.

The use of track mounted equipment increased the face labour
since trackwork required to be installed for the cutter, the
pick up loader and finally the rail mounted car.

In addition

a battery locomotive and crew backed up the pick up loader by
hauling the cars to and from the face.

Table 2.1

N.S.V. COAL CUT AND LOADED BY CONTINUOUS MINERS (OOP's tonnes)

NORTH

YEAR

CUT

WEST

LOADED

CUT

1956

232 (2.8)

232 (2.8)

1957

437 (5.2)

354 (4.2)

44 (2.7)

1958

664 (7.5)

408 (4.6)

47 (3.0)

1959

926 (10.4) 642 (7.2)

Note:-

TOTAL N.S.W.

SOUTH

LOADED

CUT

LOADED

CUT

LOADED

700 (17.6)

700 (17.6)

932 (6.7)

932 (6.7)

44 (2.7)

1525 (33.5)

1014 (22.2)

2006 (13.7)

1412 (9.6)

47 (3.0)

1884 (40.1)

1157 (24.6)

2595 (17.1)

1612 (10.6)

2508 (52.1)

1453 (30.2)

3434 (22.5)

2095 (13.7)

By June 1960 coal cut by continuous miners was 39.2% of the NSW total and a total of 69 continuous miners were
in operation.
Two firms supplied continuous miners, Jay Manufacturing and Lee Norse.
All continuous miners
unit equipment, shuttle cars, loaders, feeders, breakers, was imported of which 95% was from the U.S.

By June 1960 nearly 41.5% of all NSW coal was cut and loaded by continuous miners,
using arc wall cutters and mobile loaders, whilst 7.2% was level loaded.

51.3% was cut and loaded

The initial change in this system was the adoption of the
panel conveyor and trackless mining equipment.

The panel

conveyor in many cases up to 1965 delivered to a car loading
station.

This high level of belt conveyor utilization in

the coal mine encouraged some Australian manufacturing
companies to start home building of belt conveyors.

Other

equipment to receive attention included: mine cars, diesel
tractors and free steered vehicles.

This chapter is intended to examine the reasons for the
manufacture of these products and the current position in the
Australian mining scene.

Also discussed are: after sales

business and new business of spare parts.

2.2

Manufacturing of Men and Material Handling Equipment

2.2.1 Belt Conveyors

The use of belt conveyors for panel conveyor development
and extraction was the most efficient means available
for coal transport.

The coal could then be loaded into

rail mounted cars for hauling to the surface by
locomotive haulage.

New mines in the development stage

were planned on the basis of total conveyor application
to the surface.

From 1950 to 1960 the majority of standard conveyor
drive heads used in Australia was sourced from the U.K.
with some equipment imported from the U.S.A.

Other

drives consisting of a standard reduction gear box and
locally manufactured conveyor pulley were installed and
in the main there was a need for a locally designed
series of standard drive heads for use in underground
situations.

In addition to this requirement the

capacity of panel conveyors to meet the new generation
of continuous mining units necessitated a new approach
to conveyor structure design.

From American coal mining experience the need arose for
light weight conveyor structures readily demountable and
easily transported and erected to complement the
increased productivity of a continuous miner under
loading conditions.

The conveyor drive head sourcing

was based upon mainly U.K. suppliers and so also was the
conveyor structure supply using closed structure and
cast iron idlers.

The capacity of the U . K . conveyor structure was based o n
speeds of 1.5 to a maximum of 2.1 metres per second
which necessitated wide belts to accept the peak loads
of 600 tonnes/hour possible.

Dynamic balance of idlers

available off the shelf could not permit higher speeds
unless machined at a high cost.

At the instigation of mining operators an Australian
standard of "stringer" structure was investigated b y
some six suppliers of conveyor equipment in Australia of
whom only two had close underground mining experience.
This experience being some four to five years.

The new

standard demanded that conveyor idlers be locally
manufactured to a tolerance such that speeds of 3.0 to
3.5 metres per second could be achieved using fabricated
idlers made from selected tube and within a tolerance of
dynamic balance of 6 gm metres when tested at design
speed.

In 1960 and through to late 1961 underground

testing of samples of all suppliers of locally made
conveyor structure was conducted to determine the
reliability of the concept.

This test resulted in the

design of the 'Australian Standard Conveyor Structure'
used in ninety-nine percent of mines u n t i l the late
1970's.

Contracts were placed with selected manufacturers based
on the Standard Conveyor Structure Specification and a
highly efficient conveyor manufacturing industry was
established located in Sydney and Melbourne which
supplied the fast expanding mining industry.

In 1960 Australian Iron & Steel Pty. Ltd. installed the
largest steel cord underground conveyor in the w o r l d ,
being some 1900 metres centre to centre with a lift of
518 metres and a capacity of 600 long tons per hour.
This was quickly followed by several similar
installations and demonstrated the technical lead which
Australian manufacturers had in conveyor technology.
The design was 90% Australian input and apart from the
s t e e l cord belt a l l other equipment was manufactured in
Australia.

The conveyor structure was manufactured in

accordance with the new Australian light weight standard
and the load generated by the steel cord belt had
minimum effect o n the light weight structure after 12
years when a belt fire destroyed the installed structure.

In the period 1961 u n t i l 1980 a new generation of
standard conveyor drive heads was also developed which
catered for power ratings from 50kw to 400 kw using
standard drives with speed ranges of 3.0 to 3 . 1 m/sec.
Imports of conveyor drive heads and structure were less
than ten percent of the market in underground coal
mining.

The high quality of equipment available for conveyor
projects opened up an export market for Australia for
material handling systems in New Guinea, South East
A s i a , South Africa, North America and South America.
From 1969 to 1972 there emerged two Australian companies
who could compete in the international market in this
field from a technical viewpoint.

Since 1980 however, the two major companies have since
declined due to disputation in the metal industry byunion activity and in 1985 the companies merged within a
larger group which has failed to retain the market
against overseas designs and importations.

Staff

losses have resulted in small manufacturing companies
being formed by redundant design staff to manufacture
barely disguised copies of conveyor drives and
equipment.

No major designs have emerged locally and

the initiative in upgrading existing conveyor systems
for which there is an expanding market has originated
from overseas with subsequent importation of the
equipment.

2.2.2 Diesel Tractors, Man Cars and Free Steered Vehicles

A little recognised application of diesel engines for
off track vehicles was developed in Newcastle,
Australia, in the form of a "Minesmobile".

Developed

from an agricultural tractor the unit quickly became a
standard item of equipment in all Australian underground
coal mines.

Simultaneously, a rail mounted diesel man

car was developed capable of speeds of 14 Km/hour and
with a capacity for 14 men including the driver.
systems introduced were Free Steered Vehicles.

Other
These

innovations saw a 7% increase in output per unit shift
in New South Wales mines in general.

Off-track mainly wheeled tractor was called Free Steered
Vehicles in America and Europe.

The major overseas

raining equipment manufacturers have adopted this
description to by-pass proprietary rights of the
Australian innovators.

This can be attributed to the

fact that between 1965 and 1986, almost 90% of the
deisel engines used in underground vehicles were
imported from Abroad.

These were then locally modified

to meet the ventilation requirements of the Department
of Mineral Resources, N.S.W.

Initially, only four firms in Australia supplied the
local market but this was then increased to eight by the
entry to the market of some overseas based companies
with Australian subsidiaries.

Australian designed

vehicles modified with service facilities being marketed
overseas by the parent company from overseas.

These

products are marketed under the company names without
benefit to the Australian originators.

The locally

built unit became under pressure to compete in Australia
with an imported vehicle originally developed in
Australia because of lower labour cost from overseas.

A l l of these items are major capital expenditure items
which required the minimum of design staff in the local
office and therefore market potential evaluation tended
to be controlled b y job wise buyers, who in turn were
entrepreneurial in outlook.

Market saturation from

1960 onwards u n t i l 1982 was never a consideration and
the fringe service industry thrived with no major input
in development.

2.3

After Sales Business - Spares

To illustrate the need for definite objectives in the
development of a modern technologically sound manufacturing
industry it is appropriate to review the after sales
activities subsequent to the completion of a contract or
order for equipment.

2.3.1 Award Conditions of an Order or Contract

The award of a contract on an order for the supply of
equipment is normally accompanied by a request from the
client for a recommended list of spare parts and
consumable items.

The client will require such data to

accurately assess tenders from the financial startpoint
and also from the availability life of the equipment
being offered.

2.3.2 Major Spares, Consumable Spares

The items of equipment classified as major spares, for
example, gear units, motors, large pulleys or shafts can
be placed in inventory stock at the client's discretion
and only chargeable when required.

Consumable spares

on the other hand are normally purchased on a
maximum/minimum basis when delivered.

The Spares listed form part of the original design
package prepared by the supplier and as such is not
simple to copy if the basis of the design is not known.

2.3.3 Patent Rights

It is not always in the best interest of a supplier to
supply detailed design drawings on calculations in open
tender conditions.

For example, in the case of a bulk

winder the purchase of a spare skip is essential to the
effective maintenance of the system as this item is a
highly specialised unit of design not readily copied.
Similarly major drive shafts are not readily copied
without detailed design criteria including steel
specification and machining on heat treatment.

Since

the above items are normally long life items they are
purchased or provided for at the placement of order on
contract.

2.3.4 Effects of Loss of After Sales Business

In many cases the original supplier will not receive a
second option for a similar equipment package and
Figure 2.1 (a)

shows the typical example of the

effect of a mine winder contract on the sales of company
F. where the contract improved sales figures only over
the construction and final commissioning period.

The

company invested in research and development to meet
local specific requirements with overseas technological
assistance.

Sales of consumable spares passed to local

suppliers as soon as commissioning was complete whilst
these suppliers received the benefit of research and
development by the original suppliers.

This results in

product design stagnation since the technology is not
advanced and the manufacture in this particular example
dispensed with the design staff with the winding
experience due to lack of orders.

Figure 2.1 (b)

illustrates the problems associated

with the conveyor industry where in the case of mining
the major capital equipment consisting of the drive
head, take up motors and control gear form only 40% of
the total cost.

The consumables, namely idlers and

belting form 17% and 23% of the original cost
respectively.

In the case of idlers the local small manufacturer will
under cut the original supplier for spares since the
design can not be patented effectively.

No research is

required to copy the idlers and therefore a local
workshop can operate on a small 1/2% replacement
delivery schedule to an operation.

Australian major conveyor manufacturers pioneered
the design of lightweight balanced idlers but because of
pirated idler spares the research and development of new
designs has ceased only to be replaced by overseas
designs manufactured under licence to the parent company.

Figiire 2.1 (c)

shows a similar trend in the design

supply and manufacture of transport equipment for the
mining industry.

In this case the original designers of

a new or prototype vehicle have failed to obtain the
market position due to the undercutting of the overhaul
and repairs market by local workshops.

Figure 2.2 shows company F statistics highlighting the
steady rise of contracts or orders in the period
1967-1980 corresponding to a similar rise in research
and development. The effects of the growth upon the
companies vulnerability to trade union wages pressure is
shown and is the subject of study in Chapter 3.

These figures are graphic confirmation of the
continually high failure rate of small manufacturing
businesses which can be recognised as wild cats etc.
(Devenport, 1983). In addition, the concern at
government level cannot be more clearly shown as
evidenced by their initiatives in forming a research and
development association.

The need for effective

marketing is also identified by the loss of prospective
overseas markets due to undercutting procedures.
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2.4

Summary

The need to understand the market forces and its behaviour as
practised in Australia is one of the prime characteristics of
successful management.

A product manufacturer may not last

long unless there exists a continual and healthy need for its
products and therefore it is important that a manager should
be aware and appreciate the lack of return of research and
development funding due to pirated non genuine spares.

The

manager must understand and appreciate the challenges ahead
with regard to the marketing of its products and must
therefore allow for such eventualities and must be able to
overcome by better product design.

CHAPTER 3

INDUSTRIAL UNRESTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

3.1

Introduction

The Australian metal manufacturing industry in the first
three decades of this century was basically a service
industry to the domestic market depending largely upon
imports of capital equipment from Europe to service coal
mining, metal mining and agriculture.

During this period

the development of the two major iron and steel producing
areas of NSW at Wollongong and Newcastle, following the
closure of the Hoskins iron and steel works at Lithgow,
marked the beginning of a soundly based heavy industry.

New

coal mines were developed and these in turn brought a demand
for metal products together with a demand for consumable
spares which could be manufactured locally.

After the second world war the B.H.P. steel works at
Wollongong and Newcastle were rapidly expanded to meet the
population expansion of that period.

Australia was no

longer an island protected by distance as a result of
developments in aviation and she could no longer rely on the
mother country for protection.

The steel industry was by 1960 in a position to supply 80% of
the raw metal required for the domestic and for the
industrial market.

Metal working companies were quickly

established to respond to the expanding market.

This period

saw the emergence of major trade unions who quickly set out,
by the process of industrial disruption, to demand a share of
the boom profits made in a labour starved economy.
mining industry, expanding

The coal

by the demands of the expending

Japanese market, encouraged metal manufacturing companies to
invest in servicing that industry.

Company F is an example of a manufacturing company developed
for the purpose of servicing the mining industry and this
Chapter deals with the rise and decline of the company due
mainly to industrial unrests.

3.2

Background to Company F

Company F was formed initially by coal mining entrepreneurs
operating very successful mines in Burragaron Valley, N S W .
Some of these mines are still in operation today.

To

diversify the company interests a small manufacturing
industry was set up which was designed to service the company
mines.

Since the background of the organisation was c o a l

mining the expertise and experience gained resulted in the
mining machinery offshoot expanding into the open market
mainly in the conveyor area initially.

This expertise was

demonstrated by the completion of a conveyor system designed,
manufactured and installed by the manufacturing branch in the
Burragaron Valley known as a zig-zag conveyor complex.
(Ref. Colin Smith).

From this beginning there developed a leading mining
machinery manufacturer in Australia which finally competed in
open market tenders for major works in Australia and overseas
projects.

Figure 3 . 1 shows the management structure of

Company F in 1960.

The c o a l mining and manufacturing branches of the company
were sold off to an American Investor in 1965 and the c o a l
mining operation was separated managerially from
manufacturing with each operating independently with common
directors.
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From the period 1965 to 1969 the manufacturing branch of the
American owned company was a leading exporter of conveyor
equipment and materials handling equipment exporting in South
East Asia and North Africa.

Figure 3.2

shows the

management structure subsequent to takeover.

The success of the company attracted the attention of
overseas investors who in 1969 were actively diverting large
capital resources from mainly unstable political areas into a
booming Australian economy.

A Canadian firm successfully

bid for the F Manufacturing Company and combined other
locally owned subsidiaries into one organisation.

The

management structure was maintained as in Figure 3.2.

The manufacturing branch continued to expand into the
Australian and overseas market and obtained manufacturing
licensing from the USA and the UK for major capital equipment
required to develop the expanding coal industry.

These

items of equipment involved packages of $18 million for
single orders in some cases.

Figure 3.3 shows the

management structure of the company with staff dedicated to
marketing and this highlights the urgent need at that time
for a market plan for the Australian exporters.

The growth of Australian based metal manufacturing and export
business presented a new challenge in the field of marketing
since this area was new to the emerging companies, where a
surplus of manufacturing capacity was envisaged as the
capital investment programmes in steel, iron and to a lesser
degree coal mining slowed down in 1972.

Company F continued

to prosper throughout the period between 1970 and 1980 with
orders being at an all time high as shown in Figure 3.4.
Table 3.1 shows the details of company F in 1980.

Table

3.2 lists the employees on payroll of the Company F as of
25th February, 1981.
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Table 3.1
Details of Company 'F'

Company "F" Manufacturing (1980)

Capital

A$ 9,876,000

Manpower

264

Export Contract Values

A$ 150,000,000 (1970-1980)

Local Contract Values

A$

11,000 (Being completed)

Equipment Manufacturing Capacity - Types of Equipment

1.

Conveyors, driveheads, structure, ancillaries.

2.

Drilling and exploration.

3.

Continuous miners, shuttle cars, ration feeder breakers.

4.

Longwall - Agency and Joint Venture with leading U.K. based
Company.

5.

Railway equipment - diesel, diesel/electric, battery

6.

Tractors, trailers, free steered vehicles.

7.

Automotive industry specialised equipment for material handling.

8.

Mine fans.

9.

Mine winders.

10.

Steelworks/Blast furnace material handling.

11.

Aircraft industry - 747 tractors.

12.

Sub-contracts Ford, GMH and USA - small fabrications, specialised
castings.

Table 3.2
Employees of Company F as at 25.2.81

Section

Tradesmen

Apprentices

Fitting Shops

43

18

Machine Shops

47

17

Fabrication Shop

86

22

Press Shop

27

3

Painters

7

-

Electricians

8

3

Store

Yard

Total

16

-

6

-

240

63
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3.3

Industrial Disputes

During the successful years of the company F operations, an
industrial dispute occurred spanning over a period of four
years (between 1977 and 1981).

This dispute occurred

between the Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union and the
Australian Metal Manufacturing Industries.

The Unions had been, for some 3-4 years, campaigning for the
introduction of a 35 hour per week practice which was not
acceptable to the Metal Manufacturing Industry.

As a

consequence a number of companies were targeted for
industrial unrest in the form of strikes, restrictive work
practices, etc.

Company F was one of several mining

manufacturing companies targeted for the industrial
dispute.

Appendix

(a)

describes the record of the

industrial dispute in chronological order.

This disputation placed company F in a very difficult
position with regard to retaining the confidence of major
clients who had placed a substantial order for engineering
equipment.

The relationship between the contractor and the

clients is dealt with later in this chapter.

As the campaign of industrial unrest dragged on the employers
generally together with the Federal Government declared their
opposition to the campaign.

However this did not have any

influence on the Union's attitude.

Figure 3.5

shows the

increased level of employee's lost days during the period of
industrial dispute.

On October 31, 1980, Metal Workers at a mass meeting
throughout Australia voted overwhelmingly to call off the 35
hour week campaign.

This meant that virtually the whole

Metal Trades workforce of 600,000 had dropped out of the 35
hour week campaign, with exception of several mining
manufacturing companies including the employees of Company F.
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As neither side was prepared to make any concession, the
issue was referred to the Australian Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission.

The commission sat for hearing on

Monday 10th November 1980 at 2.20 p.m.
headed by M r . Commissioner Bennett,

The Commission was
Also present in the

hearing were representatives of the following:

The M e t a l Trades Industry Association;
The Amalgamated M e t a l Workers and Shipwrights Union;
Electrical Trades Union;
The Australasian Society of Engineers;
Federated Ironworkers Association.
The Commissioner M r . Bennett advised that the present dispute
was contrary to the established agreements and advised that
for the trade unions to make applications to the commission
for a variation of the existing awards of 40 hours of working
week or alternatively to fall in with whatever the ACTU
decides, (that is the 35 hour week must be decided by
arbitration and not by strikes).

Appendix A|3 contains the

transcrips of the proceedings of the Australian Conciliation
and Arbitration Commission.

(Federal Government Archives,

1980).

Following the Arbitration's statement Company F submitted a
proposal to end the campaign and return to the normal working
situation.

At the meeting with Shop Stewards the F

Manufacturing Company proposed the following:

An immediate review of the over-award payments to the
employees.
Resolving any disagreement about the holding of the
Christmas Party as soon as possible.

In return the Company F requested that the Shop Stewards put
to the vote that "The employees of F Manufacturing Company
follow the rest of the Metal Trades Workforce of 600,000
throughout Australia and drop 9 day / 70 hour fortnight
campaign until the A.C.T.U. Union Executive can find a better
way of conducting the campaign."

The proposal was rejected by the Shop Stewards which meant
the status quo situation.

The Shop Stewards also demanded

that the company stop communicating with its employees by
letter in future.

As the dispute continued to drag on the Company F notified
the Arbitration Commission of the continuing existence of the
dispute on the Company's shop floor.

Appendix A.3

contains the details of the submission by Company F to the
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on 23rd February,
1981.

The Conciliation and Arbitration Commission sat for hearing
on the 11th March, 1981.

Commissioner Bennett said that he

had found that sometimes it was possible to make suggestions
to parties in a dispute that might lead to settlement.

The

Commissioner indicated that this dispute was a serious one
and was affecting both the company and the employees.

Commissioner Bennet made the following recommendations:
(ACAC, 1981).

1.

There is to be a resumption of work on the basis of the
situation as existed 17th December, 1980.

2.

The Company is to withdraw its notice of the 18th
December, 1980 with respect to annual leave.

3.

The Company is to withdraw its notice of the 11th
February 1981 with respect to the collective refusal to
carry out normal duties.

4.

He is prepared to arbitrate on the matters of:

(a)

Payment for ironworkers suspended for part of a day
and continuing days in December, 1980 because of
selective bans.

(b)

Payment for public holidays for ironworkers over
the Christmas period.

(c)

Payment to employees for the period of time they
have been stood down.

5.

Upon a return to w o r k , the parties are to confer on
items 2 and 3 of the Company's statement of the 10th
March, 1981 as handed up to the Commission at its
Hearing of the 11th instant.

6.

As to the matters to be arbitrated he indicated he h a d a
heavy commitment list with the first day available being
the 25th March, 1981.

7.

He set down for hearing at 2.15 p.m. on that day, the
questions to be arbitrated.

Following the Arbitration decision handed down by
Commissioner Bennett, the Unions returned to work under the
original condition of employment, i.e. 40 hoiir week.

The

damage of industrial unrest had become so deep seated that
the company lost its credibility with clients.

This

resulted in the demise of the Company as a major supplier to
the mining industry.

The Company was later sold off and the

industrial complex was sold and is now a series of small
warehouses with no manufacturing taking place and with a
total workforce of 14 employees.

3.4

Contractual Obligation During Disputation Period

As stated previously that the industrial dispute placed the F
company in very difficult situations with various clients,
the problem of meeting the deadlines for the supply of the
products was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve.
Company F maintained in contact with the clients, informing
them of the latest with regard to the industrial dispute.
Appendix.A.4

is a typical letter forwarded to the clients.

Where an extension of time was sought by the contractor due
to industrial troubles, one of the major client's first step
was to recommend that the work be contracted out of the
disputed arena in order to avoid prolongation.

Such demand,

if it was possible to achieve, would have been to the cost of
the contractor since the client was uninvolved.

Note,

however that since a large trade union was Involved, it was
feared that an embargo could be placed on any firm
undertaking to do the work and this occurred when an attempt
to place contract outside was made.

Since this particular industrial section was not a dispute in
a true sense (that is, the trade unions were not in direct
dispute with Company F per se but they were in dispute with
Australian Metal Manufacturing Industry as a whole and that
the unions wanted to use company F as a precedent to achieve
their aims,) the client therefore accepted that "force
majeur" could be applied to permit some prolongation of the
contract provided that the contractor would only claim the
Consumer Price Authority increases for work completed but no
claims for overtime or bonus payment would be recognised.

From December 1977 until the completion of the contract in
1981 the relation between client and contractor became
increasingly strained due to the lack of progress on the
project.

Another major overseas client remained aloof from the site
operations from an industrial point of view.

The overseas

country's local trade unions strongly supported their
Australian Counterparts and generally operated on a go
slow/overtime ban and intermittent stop work meetings similar
to the tactics used at the base factory in Australia.
It is worth noting that the contractor did not carry out any
prelimary study on the views and intentions of the overseas
client country's trade unions.

The attitudes of the overseas client nevertheless can be
described as being far from supportive.

There were a number

of instances where the overseas client attempted to force the
contractor to transfer part of the work to overseas
sub-contractors and basically accept conditions which would
have created the precedent with the Australian Unions aim
thereby achieving a fait accompli.

Appendix'A >5

is a

record of the progress report dealing with the overseas
client's project.

The overseas client's unsupportive

attitude is shown in the letter subsequent to the meeting 4
and 5 December, 1980

3.5

Consequences of the Industrial Unrest

With the continuation of the industrial unrest, even after
the strike was called off, the following effects were noted:

1.

Company F began to loose contracts as w e l l as failing to
meet future contractual obligations.

2.

(Figure 3.4).

The company re-examined its investment in manufacturing
of mining equipment.

3.

A number of employees were retrenched due to the lack of
new orders.

4.

The company lost its prestige in all its entirety and
did not regain full operating capacity, eventually
abandoning major contract opportunities.

5.

Export orders were lost and also imported equipment
replaced the traditional Australian made equipment
suppplied by Company F .

6.

Technical expertise has been lost and to-date much of
the equipment supplied in major projects are overseas
based.

3.6

Conclusions

Industrial actions should be avoided where there is no cause
for such action through any fault of the employer.

Such

disputation as that dealt with in this chapter has had the
following consequences:

( i )

A d e c l ine in the technological know-how of the
country.

( ii)

Undesirable balance of payments problems brought
about by the fact that a high percentage of mining
equipment is presently being purchased from
overseas.

(iii)

Losses of job training for apprentices which
demonstrates the effect on future availability of
higher skilled workers.

Following the disputation, F company performance continued to
slide, to a present level of not more than a handful of
employees involved with mostly maintenance operations as a
serving role.

The disputation led to the management restructure with the
Managing Director at the time being invited to join the Board
of the parent company, which subsequently headed the
Australasian operations, with diverse interests.

On such

interest was gold, which is the subject of study in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER

4

46.

UPGRADING KIDSTON GOLD MINE A Development Challenge of a Low Grade Deposit

4.1

Introduction

Following the adverse effect that the industrial disputation
has had on the company F performance, the parent company
began to assess its position with regard to coal mining and
manufacturing industry.

Recognising the potential of the

company F management, the parent company transferred a
selected management staff to its headquarters.

The managing

director of company F becoming the managing director of the
parent company, Australasian operations.

The parent company

had other interests which included lubrication products and
base metal mining with special emphasis on gold mining.

The first task of the new management structure of the parent
company (called P company) was to conduct an in depth study
on the future investment direction of P company.

A decision

was reached to invest away from coal and mining machinery
manufacturing operations.

The main factors considered were:

- The poor return of manufacturing products caused by the 35
Hour Week Campaign.

(Figure 3.4).

- A possible decline in the coal industry with Japan cutting
prices for coal.

- The declining value of the Dollar in Australia.

Attentions were then focused on increased investment on gold
exploration and mining in Australia.

This increased level

of interest in gold was due to:

- Improvement in price of gold in world market against all
other metals as shown in Figure 4.1.

- The tax exemption of the gold raining operations in Australia
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- Improved exploration technology available in the form of
landsat coupled to advances in the field research
technology opened the door to investors.

- Availability of more advanced, high capacity earth moving
and excavating equipment capable of mining deposits at
much greater depth.

Old mining areas were a ready made

stepping stone particularly old alluvial developed workings
which could be re-developed as deep open cut prospects.

The tax exempt nature of the Australian gold mining companies
produced a direct incentive and this, coupled with a real
drop in wages cost over the past six years, has made for a
low cost operation comparable with world costs.

The trend

has been to short term prospects initially with yields as low
as 2.0 gm/t, but with a significantly low investment cost.
This type of operation can be geared to fluctuating gold
prices on the world market.

Kidston Mine, whilst not in the very low capital cost
category, is a prime example of a development exercise which
has not only tackled the technical aspects but has examined
and applied a social exercise in the field of human relations.
The investment and profit analysis was not based on typical
accounting procedures where a discounted cash flow exercise
determines the viability of the project.

A fresh

alternative approach was to determine the projected commodity
prices and then determine what the mine needed to look like
in order to make it economically feasible.

This chapter is concerned with the methods and procedures
adopted for the development of the Kidston Gold Mine.

The

need for management decisions based upon expertly engineered
operations carrying the minimum of contingency capital is
described.

This being the ultimate measure of the

management, engineers and other professions which were
engaged in the development of the mine.
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L O C A T I O N OF KIDSTON GOLD MINE

4.2

History of Kidston Gold Mine

Alluvial gold at Kidston was first discovered in 1907 by a
prospector Charlie Mack, after whom the mineralised zone
initially worked was named.

One of the richest patches of

alluvial gold was discovered by Jack Wise after whom Wise's
Hill has been named.

Within several months, the field was

reported to carry between 1500 to 2000 people.

The field

came to be known as "The Oaks rush Goldfield" after the
nearby Oaks Station.

(Figure 4.2).

In May 1908, the goldfield was re-named Kidston after the
then Premier of Queensland, the Hon. William Kidston.

By

1911 the alluvial deposits were quickly exhausted and the
population dropped to about 600.

Small scale open cut and

underground mining continued with varying profitability.
For example, in 1940 the Kidston Battery crushed a total of
7,380 tonnes of ore for a return of only 20.062 kg (624
ounces), i.e. one ounce per 12 tonnes.

In 1948, 5.402 kg

(168 ounces) were obtained from 1623 tonnes (i.e. one ounce
per 10 tonnes) and as a result, the Kidston State Battery was
closed down in 1949.

A total of 1260 tonnes (45,000 ounces)

of gold were reported to have been obtained from 200,900
tonnes of ore mined at Kidston during this period.

The first cyanide treatment plant was constructed at the Oaks
Liability Company Mine in 1914 to exploit the lower grade ore
available from open cut operations.

A second plant was

installed at the Kidston Syndicate Battery in 1915.

In 1922

a State battery was erected at Kidston and this continued
operating until 1949 when operations ceased.

From 1922 onwards the output of ore dwindled to 6029 tonnes
in 1939 from a total of 22 mines producing only 22.99 kg.
(715 oz) of gold roughly 1 oz. per 10 tonnes of ore rained.

The social aspect of the Kidston development from the start
of the boom is best appreciated from the Kidston school
enrollment records Table 4.1.

The school closed in 1955.

In 1980 exploration for mining at Kidston was carried out by
the Company P.

An initial evaluation estimated 6.1 Mt of

mineable ore grading at an average of 2.42 gm/t gold.

The

proven reserves stood at 34.6 Mt grading 1.86 gm/t gold and
2.27 gm/t silver, together with an additional 10 Mt of
probable reserves and some 20 Mt of possible reserves.

4.3

Location, Geology and Reserves of the Mine

The Kidston gold mine is located in Northern Queensland, some
280 km. north west of Townsville.

(Fig:ure 4.2).

Two

economic gold deposits have been identified on opposite sides
of a near vertical breccia pipe.

(Fig:iire 4.3).

The pipe

penetrated granitic and metamorphic rocks of a continual
crust segment known as the Georgetown Block.

The

predominantly proterozoic basement rocks of the block have
been subject to a number of both extrusive and intrusive
magmatic episodes in the Proterozoic Carbniferous, Permain
and Cainozoic periods.

(Butler, 1984).

Two sub-circular intrusive complexes of Permian age lie 15 km
and 40 km respectively south of Kidston.

These are the

Lachaber granite and the Bagstowe Ring Dyke Complex.

The

Kidston breccia pipe lies on the line of centres of these
complexes and may well be related genetically to the thermal
event which generated them.

T a b l e 4.1

K l d s t o n State School Enrollment (1909 - 1930)

Year

No.

1909

Year

No

1931

24

1910

39

1932

24

1912

40

1933

28

1913

57

1934

23

1914

81

1935

19

* 15

55

1936

18

*

16

36

1937

18

1917

55

1938

21

1918

60

1940

23

1919

58

1941

19

1920

54

1942

34

1921

37

1943

21

1922

58

1944

16

1923

44

1945

26

1924

37

1946

21

1925

34

1947

28

1926

24

1948

30

1927

21

Ore crushing - 1949

27

1928

21

battery closed 1950

20

1929

20

1951

17

1930

20

1952

12

* D e c l i n e in o r e g r a d e .

T h e school closed in 1955
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The Kidston breccia pipes is a zone of rock fragmentation,
induced by pressure build-up and release of escaping
volatiles generated by magma at depth.

The zone is near

vertical and is oval in plan, being some 1300 m. in a NE/SW
direction and 900 m. NW/SE.

The fragments range from very

large to less than 10 mm. in size.

In those parts of the

pipe where the gold grades reach economic levels the
fragments size ranges up to 300 mm., but is mostly less than
100 mm. in maximum dimension.

4.3.1 Mineralisation
Gold and silver are disseminated within the breccias and
in veins.

The disseminated gold is contained in a band

which lies close inside the pipe margin on the northern,
eastern and south-western sides of the pipe.

The band

is generally less than 80 m. wide, but increases to
about 120 m. on the north side (Macks-North zone) and to
200 m. at Wise's Hill on the south-west side.

The band

dips inward, but at least at Wise's Hill it has been
shown to dip shallower than the pipe margin at
increasing depths.

Figure 4.4

Kidston deposit mineralised.

shows the plan of the
The plan shows the

oxidised transition and primary ore at Wises Hill.

4.3.2 Reserves
Evaluation of the deposits relied heavily on the results
of diamond drilling programmes which totalled 22,273 m .
in 145 holes as indicated in Figure 4.3.

Proved ore

reserves are defined as those ore blocks for which the
grade has been estimated using six or more 12 m. bench
composite values.

Probable reserves are those ore

blocks for which the ore grades has been estimated using
either four or five composite values.

Possible ore

includes any block for which the grade was estimated
using two or three composites, none of which were
located within the block being estimated.
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Table 4.2

shows the Proved and Probable ore reserves

at Kidston Mine.

The reserves were calculated based on

a geostatistical interpretation of the mineral
distribution and block values interpolated from assay
composites using kriging techniques.

These values were

checked using manual polygonal estimation techniques.
(Butler, 1984).

4.4

New Approach to Appraising the Kidston Gold Mine

Initial studies conducted on the possibility of reviving
the Kidston mine concluded that the Kidston project was
a relatively unattractive risk and therefore was
rejected as uneconomic.

Critical re-examination

revealed that the rejection was based upon managerial
inflexibility and traditionally over conservative
methods of mine evaluation, construction, operation,
project commodity prices, social problems and other
contingency factors.

A fresh alternative approach was

taken which is described later in this chapter.

Table 4.2
Geological Reserves at Kidston Gold Mine

Proven
Provable

T o t a l Ore

Trade of Ore

(tonnes)

(grams per tonne)
Gold

Silver

36,250,000

1.83

2.14

8,180,000

1.51

2.25

44,430,000

1.77

2.16

Possible

14,900,000

Total

59,330,000

4.4.1 Project Re-Evaluation

The traditional method of project appraisal is to
determine what the mine would cost and then to determine
whether it would be feasible in relation to the
projected commodity prices.

Faced with the prospect of

an apparently uneconomic project, the Company P decided
to adopt a new approach: first to determine the
projected cash inflow based on probable commodity
prices, and then on the basis of this, to determine what
the mine needed to look like.

Studies conducted by Company P on the past evaluation of
the project revealed unfavourable conservatism: almost
every aspect of the infrastructure had been
significantly over-estimated, sometimes by more than
300%.

Examination of the plans, specifications, bills

of quantities and so on showed unjustifiable
over-estimâtions of quantities on even such items as
housing and dams.

Scrutiny from 1981 to 1984 progressively reduced the
capital cost estimate for the project from $180 million
to $140 million.

Manning level was reduced from 247 to

154 while at the same time raising the proposed level of
ore production from 7500 t/d to 14,000 t/d.

Re-examination of the geological reserves showed a
considerable amount of the more easily treated oxidised
ore to be located on and surrounding Wise's Hill.
Selective exploitation of this ore would enable the mill
throughout to be increased similarly from 7500 t/d to
14000 t/d.

As a result it was proposed that during the

first years of mining the bulk of the mill feed would be
oxidized ore and from 1992 onwards, the mill feed would
comprise 100% primary ore.

This would permit an

increased cash flow during the early days of production
and reduce the payback period.

4.4.2 The Kidston Gold Mine Town Vs. No Town

The issue of single industry town sites vs. commuting to
work site has been the subject of considerable
sociological research both in Australia and overseas
(Brealy and Newton 1977) and Newton and Brealy (1979)
and Baker (1981).

Neil (1982 a. and b.), Neil (1983)

and Neil, Brealey and Jones (1982).

Mining towns are expensive to construct and the
possibility always exists for them to become
psycho-social disasters.
to speak of.

At Kidston, there was no town

The population comprised 11 people with

an average age little over 75 years.

About half a

dozen dilapidated iron clad house-like structures serve
as their homes.

There was no store at Kidston, only a

post box and a telephone box.

it was therefore not

necessary to find an economic alternative to a town that
would improve the feasibility of the Kidston gold mine's
prospect as a viable package.

Cost of constructing an

acceptable town to serve a mine with a possible life of
around 15 years was yet another factor which led to the
apparent economic unfeasibility of the Kidston project.

4.4.3 Commuter Mining: the Concept of Fly in and Fly out

Commuter mining was evaluated as a possible alternative
to building a town.

Special emphasis was focused on

the concept of fly-in and fly-out with the mine workers
to be recruited from Cairns, Townsville and the Atherton
Tablelands.

(Nogas 1976).

the following advantages:

Commuter mining offered

i)

Although the overall comprehensive costs of
building a town and operating a commuter system are
approximately the same, commuter mining changes the
cost from a heavy front end capital expenditure to
an ongoing operating cost which is distributed over
the life of the mine.

ii)

Commuter mining enables better control over costs.

iii) It provides better latitude over opening and
closing the mine at short notice depending on
favourable or unfavourable changes in commodity
prices.

iv)

It overcomes the problem of deciding what is needed
to make a "successful town", within the limit of
what is economically feasible, given a mine life of
15 years.

v)

The workforce, and most importantly their families,
will not need to relocate away from family and
friends.

vi)

A constructed mining town is likely, because of
cost and remoteness, to lack many facilities
available in an established town community.

4.4.4 Labour Relations

The initial trade union reaction to "fly-in fly-out" was
negative.

Subsequently, the Trade Union Movement agreed to

the operation of a programme with further review and
evaluation to take place.

In November/December 1984, the

company commenced hiring its operations labour, centering its
activities out of the Atherton Tableland, in the Cairns
Hinterland.

4.5

Mining

Mining commenced on the Wise's H i l l orebody on November 1984,
initially to provide waste material for the completion of
roads, the crusher ramp and the mine stockpile area.

As the

orebody outcrops, only minimal stripping was required prior
to the mining of ore.

Consequently, waste was also removed

from areas of future mining to satisfy the pre-production
requirement for 125,000 t. of waste material.

The mining operation is based on conventional shovel and
truck techniques.
with 9.17m

Two P & H electric powered shovels fitted

buckets, load 9 1 t. capacity Unit Rig Lectrahaul

reardump trucks.

Other mining equipment includes two rotary

drills, two tracked bulldozers, one rubber tyred bulldozer,
one grader and a water truck.

Loading and hauling of ore

and waste are carried out on a schedule of two twelve-hour
shifts per d a y , five days a week.

The average ore production was projected to be 2.74 Mt/y but
was considerably higher than this in the early years because
of the ability of the plant to process oxide and transition
ore at a greater rate than primary ore.

Waste removal w i l l vary from 0.81 Mt. in 1985 to a peak of
6.77 M t . in 1922.

A l l waste is trucked to dumps while ore

is either delivered directly to the primary crusher o r taken
to a run-of mine dump, or a low-grade stockpile for later
processing.

4.6

Processing

T h e ore is initially crushed in a primary gyratory crusher
and fed to a 25,000 t . live capacity stockpile.

Ore is

reclaimed from the stockpile using vibrating feeders and is
conveyed to a two-stage grinding circuit consisting of an
8.23 m . diameter semi-autogenous grinding mill in closed
circuit w i t h s c r e e n s , followed by a ball mill in closed
circuit w i t h cyclones.

Sodium cyanide and lime are added to the grinding c i r c u i t .
Figure 4.4

shows the flow chart for the Kidston treatment

plant.

T h e cyclone overflow is treated in two parallel cyanidation
c i r c u i t s , each containing a series of five mechanically
agitated t a n k s .

Additional lime and cyanide are added to

the feed.

T h e p u l p is then pumped through two p a r a l l e l , four-stage
cyclone w a s h circuits.

The coarse cyclone underflow is

discharged from the fourth stage as tailing.

The finer cyclone overflow pulp containing the precious
m e t a l - b e a r i n g s o l u t i o n , flows to two high capacity thickeners
o p e r a t i n g in p a r a l l e l .

The thickener overflow solutions are

treated in two parallel carbon column circuits, each
containing five stages in series.

Gold and silver are

absorbed on to activated carbon and the barren solutions j o i n
the p l a n t reclaim water system.

T h i c k e n e r u n d e r f l o w pulps are pumped via trash screens to a
single stream carbon-in-pulp circuit containing six
m e c h a n i c a l l y agitated tanks.

Barren slurry is d i s c h a r g e d

via s a f e t y screens to minimize carbon loss and p u m p e d to the
tailings p o n d .
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The tailings containment area is designed for zero discharge
to the environment with the process water being reclaimed and
pumped back to the plant for re-use.

Loaded carbon is ducted from the carbon columns and pumped
from the carbon-in-pulp tanks to the desorption circuit for
the recovery of gold and silver.

Desorption is carried out

using hot caustic soda solution under pressure through one of
three available vessels.

The precious metal-bearing

solution is passed through a heat exchanger where it is
cooled by the incoming solution and flows to electro winning
cells where the gold and silver are deposited on steel wool
cathodes.

When fully loaded, the cathodes are processed by

smelting to produce ore bullion.

Barren solution is

re-circulated through the heat exchanger and then via a
heater to the desorption column.

The desorbed carbon is transferred to a vessel for acid
washing and is then processed through a reactivation kiln.
The reactivated carbon is screened to remove lines, and is
stored for re-use.

Make-up carbon is attritioned and

screened to remove fine lines before being added to the
carbon circuit.

The dore bullion contains approximately 58% gold and 37%
silver and is shipped for custom refining elsewhere into
"good delivery" bars of 400 oz. (12.44 kg), the gold bars
being of not less than 99.5% purity and the silver of not
less than 99.9% purity.

The first dore bullion was produced on February 6, 1965
Projected production for the first twelve months of full
operation is 281,000 oz. (8,740 kg.) of gold and 164,000 o z .
(5,100 kg.) of silver.

This output will make Kidston

Australia's largest producing gold mine.

^•7

Financing the Project & the Foreign Investment Review Board

The Foreign Investment Review Board's requirements for
foreign-owned companies was yet another factor that reduced
the attractiveness of the Kidston Gold Mines package.

It

affected how Company P was to go about getting equity and
when to share float.

The Foreign Investment Review Board required a 50% Australian
participation in Kidston Gold Mines prior to a full scale
development of the mine.

Additional problems arose for the

project at this point in time as a result of:

. A substantial fall in the price of gold.

. General decline in stock market confidence.

. Possible introduction of a tax on gold.

These market conditions made it difficult to obtain a partner
or to gain Australian equity by way of a public float.
Negotiations resulted in the Federal Treasurer giving
Company P credit for its 10% level of Australian ownership in
Company P Development.

As a result, the Treasury required

that only 45% of Kidston Gold Mines be sold to Australian
interests in order that it complied with the Federal
Government's foreign investment guidelines for new resource
projects.

Over the two to three years from 1980, determined efforts
were made with little success to sell 45% of the property to
Australian financial institutions and public companies.
Potential partners were asked to contribute approximately $50
million up-front and then support 45% of the remaining
project costs.

In return for a 63% investment in project

cost, they were to receive 45% of the profit.

According to this arrangement, their return on Investment
would be approximately 8% on what they considered to be a
high-risk venture.

Naturally, Australian financial

Institutions found the proposition unattractive.

A different approach to the problem was therefore required.
There was a need to selectively look for a company that would
gain advantages from such a project other than by being a
straight partner.

Company P developed a position statement

that defined the criteria that the potential partner was
required to possess.

It was necessary for the company to:

. Be progressive and venturesome.

. Understand gold in order to assist in the marketing of
gold - perhaps through a Gold Futures Trading Division.

. Be a financier so as to provide low interest rates perhaps through a Finance Division.

. Possess a Construction Division with mine construction
experience - preferably in Queensland in order to take
advantage of the mine construction project.
. Gain substantial tax advantages by operating the mine,
recognising of course that this would divide the
organisation and therefore add to the managerial complexity
of the operation.

The one company that fulfilled the above criteria was Company
X.

As a result, Company X was approached and a lengthy

negotiation process commenced.

In the final arrangement,

Company X purchased a 20% equity in Kldston Gold Mines for
$25 million.

This allowed Company P to obtain approval from the Foreign
Investment Review Board to commence construction of the mine
on the understanding that the remaining 25% was to be floated
to the public prior to production commencing.

With the

subsequent dramatic drop in the price of gold, the Federal
Treasurer's approval was sought to partly fulfill the
commitment to float in 1984 and to defer the remainder of the
float to when it was hoped market circumstances would
improve.

Attention was drawn to the number of floats being

shelved and others that had proceeded but were proving to be
less than successful.

The negotiations proved successful and the Government
permitted Company P to float 10% in 1984 and the remaining
15% within 6 months of the earliest date allowable under
Stock Exchange regulations.

Company X opted to float 5% of

their 20% equity and the structure at the 1984 offering was
as shown in Figure 4.6.

The next problem to contend with was whether the float would
be a success.

Experience, history and the signs of the

times were proving that leaving the float in the expert hands
of the underwriters was no guarantee of success.

In order

to maximise the opportunity for success. Company P soon
recognised the critical need to "sell" the float to the
Australian public over and above the "order taking" approach
generally adopted by underwriters in this country.
Operation "sell" K.G.M. began.

Every colleague, business

associate, business acquaintance, personal acquaintance,
friend, friend of friends, enemies and friends of enemies
were phoned and were either persuaded, coerced or directed to
buy K.G.M. shares that were about to be offered.
was an overwhelming success.

The result

The float was 40%

oversubscribed at a time of difficult market circumstances.

Australian Public
Shareholders
100%

p

Holdings

100%
I

P

Exploration
55%

15%

15%

15%

Kidston Gold Mines

FIGURE 4.6

COMPANY STRUCTURE OF KIDSTON GOLD
LIMITED

MINES

4.8

Results and Conclusions

The construction of the Kidston gold mine was completed 3
months ahead of schedule at a cost reduced by some $50
million from the original budget.

The 12 month construction

programme also included:

. Upgrading of 80 km. of unsurfaced roadway including
bridges and concrete causeways to deal with the flood prone
nature of the area and make it an all-season road.

. Building of a 21,000 megalitre dam across the Copperfield
River and the laying of 22 km. of pipes and construction
of booster stations.

. Construction of 292 km. of 132 kV transmission line from
Townsville.

. Construction of motel-type accommodation and recreational
facilities 5 km. north of the minesite.

Upgrading of an airstrip to accommodate 24-hour per day
all-season flight facilities.

In its initial 12 months of operation the mine is projected
to produce 9034.15 Kg. (281,000 ounces) of gold making it
Australia's largest gold producing mine.

During the first

five years of operation, the projected annual average is
6301.40 Kg. (196,000 ounces) of gold and 5015.40 Kg. (156,000
ounces) of silver.

This is already being reviewed with a

view to upgrading.

The present market value of Kidston is

estimated to be in excess of $500 million.

The payback period has been effectively reduced from 5 years
to 1.5 years.

The life span of the mine is to increase from

the estimated 15 years to more than 20 years.

Tables 4.3

and 4.4 list the statement of changes in financial position
and balance sheet at 31 December 1985 respectively.

TABLE 4.3

STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN
KIDSTON

GOLD

MINES

ENDING

31ST DECEMBER.

SOURCE OF FUNDS

Net Profit/(Loss) for the year
Add: Depreciation
Income tax
Amortisation of exchange losses
Funds from operations
Add: Proceeds from borrowings
— Bank loans
— Other borrowings
Proceeds from share issues

APPLICATION OF FUNDS

Fixed assets (net of exchange losses)
Refundable deposit
Deferred foreign exchange losses
Payment of dividends — common
— preferred
Repayment of loans
Net effect of debt allocation between short and long term
Increase/(Decrease) in working capital
Working capital at beginning of year
Working Capital at End of Year

FINANCIAL

LIMITED.

FOR

POSITION.
THE

1985

1985

1984

50,759,003
9,590,330
285,000
2,464,606
63,098,939

Nil

859,636
16,199,038
80,157,613

42,264,553
37,547,121
25,000,000
104,811,674

12,399,655
(4,111,560)
13,966,961
6,250,000
3,904,935
44,241,636
2,018,256
78,669,883
1,487,730
(23,414,316)
(21,926,586)

121,753,547
4,111,560

4,096,686
3,577,791
12,657
5,301,246
12,988,380

96,671

125,865,107
(21,053,433)
(2,360,883)
(23,414,316)

ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN WORKING CAPITAL

Increase/(Decrease) in current assets
Cash and short term deposits
Trade receivables
Other debtors and prepayments
Inventories
Increase/(Decrease) in current liabilities
Bank loans and overdrafts
Other borrowings
Trade creditors
Other creditors and accrued expenses
Amounts payable to related companies
I ncrease /(Decrease) in Working Capital

22,077,302
(6,694,879)
1,923,180
(2,503,914)
(3,301,039)
11,500,650
1,487,730

105,922
2,624,089
2,826,682
6,835,650
6,694,879
6,607,630
3,741,956
23,880,115
(21,053,433)

YEAR

TABLE

4.4-

B A L A N C C E S H E E T , K I D S T O N GOLD
A T 31ST DECEMBER,

Notes

s

10

Share Capital and Reserves
Issued and fully paid
125,000,000 Ordinary shares
1 Redeemable preference share
(par value 20 cents)
Asset revaluation reserve
Accumulated Profit

25,000,000

12

25,000,010
40,604,068

^

25,000,010

6,976,069
5,684,335
26,638,148
42,264,553
37,547,121
79,811,674

65,604,078
Current Liabilities
Bank loans and overdrafts
Other borrowings
Provision for income tax
Trade creditors
Other creditors and accrued expenses
Owing to related companies
Non Current Liabilities
Bank loans
Other borrowings

4
5

4,111,560

4
5

2.624,089
105,922
2,853,911
131,449,832

50,610,456
50,610,456
154,638,332

Fixed Assets

6

127,762,241

Other Non Current Assets
Investments
Deferred foreign exchange losses
Refundable deposit

8
9

11,033,800
11,033,800

4,111,560
20.900
103,000

28,990,246
654,921
1,923,180
4,472,155
2,383,296
38,423,798

131,449,832
124,484,361

1985
$

3

25,000,010

6,912,944
6,694,879
369,921

LIMITED,

1985

1984

25,000,000

MINES

Current Assets
Cash at bank
Short term deposits
Trade receivables
Inventories
Other debtors and prepayments

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these
accounts.

7

10,586
4,210,000
3,577,791
7,925,335
118,579
15,842,291
154,638,332

n

TABLE 4.4-

Statement of Profit & Loss
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER, 1985

Kidston Gold Mines Limited

1984

Notes

Nil
Nil
$Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
$Nil

Sales revenue
Other revenue

Operating profit for the year
Income tax expense
Net profit for the year
Accumulated Profit at 31 December, 1984

1985
$

100,635,454
920,497
$101,555,951
10
11

51,044,003
285,000
50,759,003

m

50,759,003
Deduct:
Dividends
Accumulated Profit at 31 December. 1985

The accompanying notes form an integral part of these
accounts.

12

10,154,935
$40,604,068
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

In the Australian political climate the demand for a coal plan to
market the product to retain price values is unlikely to succeed
since the product must be consumed if produced.

The goal must be

to produce a review of reserves and a concrete development
programme geared to exploitation of readily accessible reserves
with a balanced research and development programme for deep mining
geared to the 21st century.

Gold production should be an integral part of the economic plan
scheme for Australia.

Since deep gold mining will not be highly

productive unless new mechanisation methods are introduced in the
next two decades, financiers must be encouraged to examine the
relationship between two valuable assets where one can be
recovered and stored in a vault and the other in situ.

The slide

of the Australian Dollar in 1986 produced an inflationary effect
which prompted government intervention to prevent heavy selling of
the Australian Dollar.

This slowed the spiral but high interest

rates coupled to a buoyant share market have again pushed the
Australian Dollar upwards to remove the competitive boost which
should have helped the mineral export industry.

A formula for the mining industry marketing strategy must
therefore be geared to the exchange rate i.e. "the price" and the
sale of gold should be reflected in a corresponding rise in the
sale of coal at a competitive price.

The only solution to the problem is a major reduction in costs
both at the mine and in government charges.

The weaker coal

mining operations in N.S.W. will falter with consequent reduction
in state revenue, to the state railways, port handling authorities
and ancillary supporting industries.

Unemployment in the coal

mining industry will occur and is occurring and massive capital
injection cannot be justified nor solve the problem of over supply
of coal in the world market.

The scenario for marketing of gold and coal is on the one hand to
produce more gold at a cheaper production cost and sell a product
which carries no impediments in the form of specification, is
easily transportable and can be stored indefinitely.

On the other hand coal must be produced at a cost which is
competitive with Chinese, Columbian and South African prices where
labour charges are only 38% of cost against 60% in Australia.
The coal must be either sold on a strict specification for export
or simply marketed as a product with a wide application.

For

both cases the producers cannot continue to produce as loss will
be inevitable.

The 35 Hour/Week campaign and its consequences have resulted in
the demise of the mining manufacturing industry.

Skills are

being lost and the consequent training of new apprentices is
affected, contributing to the low skilled manpower source which is
undesirable.

The Arbitration system has not succeeded in solving industrial
problems.

The Kidston Gold Mine project is an outstanding example of
management and unions working together, not being put off by past
practices and recommendations.

It is therefore recommended that:
There should be a major reduction in cost both in the mine and
government charges to permit a healthy exploitation of the
resources;
Increased emphasis on gold production as it is a product which
carries no impediments in the form of specification.

There should be a coal plan to achieve the conservation of
coal to await future technology which will make the most
efficient and environmentally acceptable use of coal.
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Appendix A 1 (a)
TO:

Directors.

FROM:-

Executive Director, Company 'F'.

SUBJECT:- 35 Hour Week Campaign - Proposed Response by Company.

DATE:-

1.0

4th September, 1980.

Background

To ensure that the matter of the current situation with
respect to the A.M.W.S.U.'s campaign for a 35 hour working
week is put into proper perspective, it is essential that
there be a full comprehension of the events that have shaped
the industrial relations environment in which the Company is
now in.

Set down below in chronological order is a record of the
events as mentioned.

1.1

The first tangible indication that the 35 hour week
would be the emerging industrial issue of the 1980's
occurred in February of this year with the notification
of a dispute at Union Carbide's Altona (Victoria) plant
where members of the A.M.W.S.U. employed by Union
Carbide demanded the company grant to them a 35 hour
week.

In addition, in the February issue of the A.M.W.S.U.
journal. Federal Secretary Carraichael advised that
certain amendments to A.C.T.U. policy by Congress had
cleared the way for a shorter working week to become an
industrial issue.

He also advised that such a campaign

in Australia would complement the International
Metalworkers Federation's recent decision for a campaign
for a shorter working week.

It was also apparent that the electricity supply
authorities in all States other than New South Wales and
South Australia would be seeking a 35 hour week at the
earliest possible time.

1.2

By April, the M.T.I.A. had determined to commence a
pamphlet/leaflet type education programme aimed at
warning employees of the economic employment
consequences of support for the action proposed by their
respective union executives.

As well, the first rumblings from the Queensland power
workers seeking a 35 hour week were heard and the matter
of the 35 hour week at Altona had been listed for
further hearing in May before a Full Bench following a
lengthy sit-in strike by A.M.W.S.W. workers.

However

it would appear that one of the reasons for the Altona
Hearing having been deferred until May was that the
A.M.W.S.U. was not ready to proceed.

In addition, toward the end of April the A.M.W.S.U.,
A.S.E., F.I.A., F.E.D.F.A. commenced their compaign for
a 37 1/2 hour week at Pilkington-A.C.I.

On the 30th April the A.M.W.S.U.'s campaign for a 35
hour week commenced.

1.3

Throughout May an attempt was made by the M.T.I.A. to
either bring the 35 hour week matter before the Full
Bench of the Arbitration Commission and/or to use the
national wage hearing as a forum for discrediting the
campaign of the A.M.W.S.U.

In spite of such efforts however, the A.M.W.S.U.
campaign had taken hold to the extent that the majority
of organisations, where members of the A.M.W.S.U. formed
the dominant portion of the work group, were working 35
hours on each fourth week of the month with overtime
restricted to a maximum of eight hours on the other
three weeks (and of course nil overtime in the short
week).

In the Pilkington-A.C.I. dispute the employers had told
the Arbitration Commission that if the campaign was to
continue they would not be able to compete with foreign
companies.

In response the union claimed that

Australia already produced the cheapest glass in the
world and could well afford a shorter week.

1.4

In June and July the Arbitration Commission threatened
to defer the National Wage Case unless the A.C.T.U.
pulled back the metal unions' campaign for a 35 hour
week.

An attempt by the A.C.T.U. and the Executive of

the metal unions to so pull back was framed in
resolution form but when put to a mass meeting of metal
union shop stewards, the combined A.C.T.U./Union
Executives' resolution was defeated by a vote of 8 to 1
against.

The New South Wales Railways Unions represented by the
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council arranged to
see Premier Wran re a 35 hour week claim.
Differences between the A.M.W.S.U., other metal unions
and the A.C.T.U. saw S.E.C. Victoria workers going it
alone on a 35 hour week compaign.

In Western Australia, the Alcoa, Pinjarra dispute over
the 35 hour week appeared likely to spread nationally
within Alcoa and possibly to the extent that the entire
aluminium refining industry could be threatened/become
involved.

The Federal Government involved itself in the campaign
when it announced it would take positive action per
medium of the P.J.T. against companies who looked like
conceding to union demands.

However Government threats

of retaliatory action were seen generally as hollow in
view of the wound down condition of the P.J.T. and the
known length of time it would take for the conducting of
an enquiry into the effect of shorter hours on prices.
In addition two of the tobacco/food companies who had
been about to make agreements for a shorter working week
were able to negotiate with the Government for no action
to be taken on the basis that their arrangements had
been made prior to the issue of the edict.

In spite of

the above, however, any organisation hoping for
favourable consideration by the Federal Government on
any matter would be best advised to be sensitive to the
Government's stated attitude to the shorter working week.

By the end of July, power workers in Western Australia
had been granted a 37 1/2 hour week and power workers in
Tasmania had commenced negotiations for the same.

The M.T.I.A. claimed success in its campaign against the
35 hour week.

The A.C.T.U., metal unions and the A.M.W.S.U. appeared
to have split on the method of handling the 35 hour week
campaign with the A.M.W.S.U. still prepared to go it
alone.

On the 30th July, 1980 T,A. Field Pty. Ltd. announced
its intention of introducing a 37 1/2 hour week to its
1,000 employees at Orange, Rockhampton and Brisbane
respectively and Alcoa announced its intention to stand
down 1,300 of its employees in Western Australia over
the 35 hour week dispute.

1.5

By August the dispute in the glass industry had
developed to the extent that Ford and G.M.H. were forced
to stand down 3,000 employees.

The A.M.W.S.U. refused

to allow arbitration of the 35 hour working week issue
and had turned the Pilkington-A.C.I. dispute into an
issue over redundancy pay.

(Pilkington was eventually

settled with an increased redundancy pay offer).

The Alcoa, Pinjarra 35 hour claim had also turned into a
wage claim which was settled by Arbitration with
increases of $18.00 - $23.40 per week, plus back p a y ,
and increased long service leave payments being granted.

In both the Pilkington and Aloca disputes, the 35 hour
week campaign continued unabated in spite of the
concessions granted.

Towards the end of August, the A.C.T.U. resolved as
follows:
- Quote (1)

That at this point of time "an across the board"
approach to reduced working time involving
industrial action is inappropriate.

(2)

Unions in appropriate areas should seek in
consultation with the A.C.T.U., to establish
reduced working time by direct negotiation.

(3)

Priority areas should be determined and the maximum
effort allocated to the development of campaigns in
these areas.

(4)

That the plan of action for a shorter working week,
involving concentrated involvement in the power,
aluminium and other sectors as outlined be endorsed.

(5)

In accordance with this plan the A.C.T.U. will
initiate a campaign of publicity and education
commensurate with the magnitude and priority of the
issue.

- Unquote In addition Sir John Moore commenced the hearing of a
claim for 35 hour working week for drivers employed by
oil agents in the Northern Territory (similar to the 35
hour working week granted to oil industry agents'
drivers in New South Wales following the Leon Laidley
dispute).

Towards the end of August the F.I.A. announced its
support for the A.C.T.U.'s push for a shorter working
week in the aluminium industry.

2.0

M.T.I.A. Advice

On Tuesday 2nd September the M.T.I.A. was contacted to
enquire as to their view of the situation in respect to the
35 hour week campaign and was advised as follows:

2.1

The A.M.W.S.U. campaign had settled down to 35 hours per
week being worked in one week each month with no
overtime in that week and a restriction of eight hours
overtime per week in the other weeks of the month.

2.2

On a national level the A.M.W.S.U. only was pushing the
35 hour campaign with the F.I.A. and other metal unions
having joined with the A.C.T.U. in its campaign (see
above).

2.3

The A.M.W.S.U. is to meet next Tuesday the 9th September
to consider its position and the M.T.I.A. will be
holding meetings on Monday and Tuesday the 8th and 9th
respectively to do likewise.

2.4

The M.T.I.A. had conducted surveys recently and had
established that in a number of companies, employees
were not engaging in the short week campaign.
Unfortunately the association could not advise which of
those companies had A.M.W.S.U. members as the dominant
portion of the workforce.

3.0

Company Survey

From the 2nd to 4th September the company conducted its own
survey contacting a number of local companies or
organisations engaged in similar work and as a result gained
the following impressions:

3.1

One company only was in the situation of having some of
its employees not following the campaign on the short
week.

This company was International Combustion.

It

did appear that at International Combustion the F.I.A.
have split with the A.M.W.S.U.

The company has had

some difficulties with respect to overtime and in
addition the A.M.W.S.U. has claimed a 2 1/2% wage
increase.

3.2 The majority of organisations that the company
management contacted were found to be subjected to the
standard campaign.

Indeed even those companies which

suggested that their employees were committed to the
campaign with reluctance, were not prepared to forecast
the emergence of an International Combustion situation
as outlined in 3.1 above.

3.3

In one circumstance only, that being (J) Manufacturing,
did the company management establish that the A.M.W.S.U.
had stepped up its campaign to the extent that the
employees of (J) Manufacturing are absenting themselves
one in every ten working days with overtime being
restricted to 24 hours in every month.

4.0

Implications - Prospects for the Future

Following upon the above research and review it would appear
that a reasonable interpretation of the information as
outlined would be as follows:

4.1 National events have limited effects on what may or may
not occur in the various workshops/piants around the
nation.

Hence claims of success/failure by the

A.C.T.U., A.M.W.S.U., M.T.I.A. etc., and the outcome of
ideological differences between various unions etc. are
of academic interest only to an organisation that finds
itself in the unfortunate situation of being under siege,

4.2

From the history of the disputes at Alcoa,
Pilkington-ACI and Union Carbide, it would appear that
the 35 hour campaign in each of those places created an
appropriate environment for success by the unions with
alternate claims.

However the expensive concessions granted by the
companies did not resolve the 35 hour working week
issue.

Indeed the A.M.W.S.U. has resisted a l l demands

to have the 35 hour claim itself arbitrated.

4.3

Shop stewards have had to work so hard to gain support
for this campaign that their potential loss of face
should they be unable to gain some success (even if
minor) is considerable.

Hence the campaign has

resulted in:

4.3.1 Reduced hours at T.A. Field Pty. Ltd.
4.3.2 Increased wages at Alcoa.
4.3.3 Redundancy payments at Pilkington - A.C.I.

4.3.4 Wage increase claims at International Combustion.
Etc.

4.4

It would appear that organisations that have been
selected to be the subject of a stepped up campaign are
being chosen on something of an association basis.
Examples of the above are:

4.4.1 The electricity industries in States other than
New South Wales and South Australia on the basis
of what has happened in New South Wales etc.
4.4.2 The o i l agents' drivers in the Northern Territory
on what has happened in New South Wales.

4.4.3 The aluminium refining industry on what has
happened with respect to the hours worked by
those actually mining for aluminium.

4.4.4 The claim against Union Carbide (as Altona is a
petrochemical plant) on the basis of the o i l
industry.

4.4.5 Possibly J Manufacturing on its association with
mining industry-

If this is the case the prospects for F Manufacturing of
course do not look good.
4.5

Other variables to be taken into account in attempting
to predict what may or may not happen in the future - in
priority order - are:
4.5.1 The dominance of the A.M.W.S.U. in the workplace.

4.5.2 The degree of militancy of the A.M.W.S.U.

4.5.3 The past industrial history of a particular shop.

4.5.4 The reaction of a particular organisation to the
campaign.

4.5.5 The level of overtime previously
worked/available and/or about which there is an
exception.

4.5.6 The nature of the market in which an organisation
is a competitor.

4.6

It would appear that:
4.6.1 The eventuality of a 35 hour working week in the
metal industry is as inevitable as the fact that
the sun comes up in the morning.

4.6.2 When the 35 hour week is Introduced there will be
a real increase in costs of approximately 12 1/2%
and a corresponding drop in productivity which
will have a marked and dramatic effect on the
viability of the metal industry.

4.6.3 The campaign for the 35 hour week will continue
for a considerable period of time with the
possibility that in certain areas the current
campaign will be stepped up.

4.7

With the matters as raised in 4.6 above in mind, it
would appear that from the week ending 5th September,
1980 and thereafter, it behoves the management of F
Manufacturing to take maximum advantage of the hours now
available to us with the hope of maximising productivity
relative to what may occur in the near/intermediate
future,

5.0

Management Approach

If the Manufacturing organisation is to succeed in holding
the line at the present situation it is important that the
following be appreciated:

5.1

In all disputes the specific if not selfish interests of
the disputants are all important and all pervading,
and

5.2

There are those whose lot in any dispute is that they
have to suffer.

In the instance of this dispute as it

affects F Manufacturing, such persons happen to be
supervisory and other associated staff.

And with such an appreciation the action to be taken is as
follows:

Recommendat ions

1.

Management will, with sympathy, understand and
appreciate the suffering and hurts of the supervisory
and associated staff, but will insist that supervisors
be forbidden from using the 35 hour working week
campaign with its problems as an excuse for failure to
meet our pre-determined deadlines.

2.

Management to insist that supervisors are to increase
their efforts and usual motivational activities in order
to overcome the obstacles and drop in morale generated
by this campaign.

3.

There be a rigid adherence to procedures, controls and
policies.

4.

No overt action be taken or statements made that might
assist shop stewards to further arouse the workforce.

5.

Matters of staff discipline, labour problems etc. to be
discussed in the first instance with the Manager
Personnel and Industrial Relations.

6.

Work commence immediately on both short and long term
plans aimed at reducing the ultimate effect of the
shorter working week.

7.

Otherwise the 35 hour working week campaign to be
treated as a non-event.

APPENDIX A 1 (b)

A Report to the Directors of

Company F, dealing with the

Issue of 35 Hour Week Campaign

at F Manufacturing Company.

Appendix A 1 (b)

COMPANY F INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO:-

Directors.

FROM:-

Executive Director.

SUBJECT:- 35 Hour Week Campaign at F Manufacturing Company.

DATE:-

10th November, 1980.

Background

The Manufacturing Company has been subjected to the metal unions
35 hour compaign since June, 1980,

In fact the campaign has been

applied in two phases: the first being from June to 26th September
in which members of both the metal unions and the Storemen and
Packers absented themselves on strike for 5 hours one week in
every four with an overtime limitation of 8 hours on the first,
second and third week and with a complete ban on overtime on the
strike week.

The second phase has been applied since the 29th

September when the 35 hour campaign was escalated to an 8 hour
strike every second Monday.

Consequently all factory employees

were absent from work, on strike, on the 29th September, 13th and
29th October.

You will recall that I advised in a report dated 4th September of
the national situation with respect to the 35 hour campaign, of
circumstances with respect to the Company, and of the consequent
effect upon Company P.
was:

The action I recommended should be taken

1.

Management will, with sympathy, understand and appreciate the
suffering and hurts of the supervisory and associated staff,
but will insist that supervisors be forbidden from using the
35 hour working week campaign with its problems as an excuse
for failure to meet our pre-determined deadlines.

2.

Management to insist that supervisors are to increase their
efforts and usual motivational activities in order to
overcome the obstacles and drop in morale generated by this
campaign.

3.

There be a rigid adherence to procedures, controls and
policies.

4.

No overt action be taken or statements made that might assist
shop stewards to further arouse the workforce.

5.

Matters of staff discipline, labour problems etc. to be
discussed in the first instance with the Manager Personnel
and Industrial Relations.

6.

Work commence immediately on both short and long term plans
aimed at reducing the ultimate effect of the shorter working
week.

7.

Otherwise the 35 hour working week campaign to be treated as
a non-event.

In the following week at a meeting you convened at Smithfield,
also attended by the General Manager, Marketing Manager, Assistant
Marketing Manager and myself, it was determined that:

(a)

We should establish the circumstances of our competitors.

(b)

Attempt to organise the M.T.I.A. into taking specific action
on behalf of mining equipment manufacturers and/or other
employers who appeared to be bearing the brunt of the metal
unions campaign.

(c)

Seek to extend the time on any outstanding contracts or where
possible consider increasing our prices.

Action Taken Since September, 1980.
1.

Meetings of Foremen were convened at which they were advised
to embark on a general tightening up campaign.

To assist

them in this exercise the instruction to all staff (Appendix
I attached) was placed on all notice boards.

2.

??????

Following complaints from Foremen as to specific problems
with some shop stewards the instruction dated 16th October,
(Appendix II attached) was issued.

?????

(The above being in accordance with my recommendations of 4th
September, 1980)

3.

Since the 26th September there has been liaison with our
major competitors as to their industrial situation.

In

addition the assistance of the M.T.I.A. has been sought and
on the 10th October we provided them with a list of mining
equipment manufacturers.

Subsequently on the 24th October

and 4th November meetings of what has now become known as
"Schedule 1 Employers" were held at the M.T.I.A.

Over the two meetings it was established that J
Manufacturing, V Engineering, N. Coy, M. Coy, T Manufacturing
in Newcastle (up to the 31st October, 1980, and in Wollongong
since 31st October 1980) and as well as this Company were
being subjected to the 9 day, 72 hour fortnight campaign.

5

major companies, whilst still being subjected to the standard
35 hour campaign indicated at the meeting of 4th November
that they anticipated the worst.

4.

The M.T.I.A. further advised at the meetings as mentioned
above:

(a)

That efforts were being made by the national employers
to stop the national wage case, set down for hearing on
11th November, 1980 from going ahead (with limited
prospect of success).

(b)

That at meetings of metal trades union members held on
the 31st October the standard 35 hour campaign was
called off (but not the 9 day fortnight campaign).

(c)

That in spite of (b) above those employers still being
affected by the campaign were industries in Altona,
Victoria, the Victorian ship building industry, A.C.I.
Glass, mining equipment and agricultural implement
manufacturers, industries in Wollongong and some
industries in Newcastle.

5.

At the M.T.I.A. meeting of 24th October, 1980 the action
companies affected by the continuing campaign were asked to
consider taking collectively was:

(a)

To treat a strike day as severing continuity of service
so that accrued annual leave of employees would be
forfeited.

(b)

Returning employees to award payments only.

(c)

Standing down employees who are not able to be gainfully
employed.

(d)

Banning overtime.

(e)

Commencing a publicity campaign directed specifically at
or on behalf of those industries still affected.

(f)

Notifying the Commission.

The M.T.I.A. meeting of 4th November, 1980 resolved to notify
the Commission of a dispute and embark at the same time on an
extensive publicity campaign aimed at the effects of this
campaign upon our specific Industry.

The publicity campaign

will be pitched to gain national coverage.

Appendix A.2

THE AUSTRALIAN CONCILIATION
AND ARBITRATION COMMISSION

C No 4245 of 1980

F MANUFACTURING LIMITED and
OTHERS

and

THE AMALGAMATED METAL WORKERS
AND SHIPWRIGHTS UNION and
OTHERS

Notification pursuant to
section 25 of the act of a
dispute re 35-hour week.

MR. COMMISSIONER BENNETT

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 1980, at 2.20 p.m,

Copyright in the Commonwealth Government

THE COMMISSIONER: Could I have the appearances please?

MR. A.C. EVANS: If it please, Mr. Commissioner, I appear with raycol league MR. E.P. HENNESSY for the Metal Trades Industry
Association.

MR. S. MAURICE: I appear for the Amalgamated Metal Workers and
Shipwrights Union.

MR. D. MURADA:

I appear for the Electrical Trades Union.

MR. B. COCHRAN: If the commission pleases, for the Australasian
Society of Engineers.

MR. W. GRANTHAM: If the commission pleases, I represent the
Federated Ironworkers Association.

THE COMMISSIONER:

This is a notification by the metal Trades

Industry Association.

MR. EVANS:

Mr. Evans?

Mr. Commissioner, this is a serious dispute, and

equally it is an unfortunate dispute as I will outline to you in a
moment.

Of course you will be aware from the notification that

it concerns the claim by the metal trades unions for a 35-hour
week; that is a general claim, and this has up till now been part
of our claim.

It is a serious dispute because these companies -

or at least some of them - and equally the employees in these
particular companies are amongst the hardest hit in this very long
campaign.

This dispute is centred only in New South Wales, this particular
dispute.

I suppose in the metal trades industry itself there has

been more bloodshed in this particular sector by the employees and
by the companies than in any other sector.

It is true we have

fairly significant disputes at Altona - that is in Victoria; we
have a dispute by metal workers in the glass industry, which is
significant and has been before this commission, but that is
Australia wide.

In relation to the general run of the metal trades factories,
except perhaps with one possible exception, as I say both sides
here have taken a real battering, and we are hopeful that as a
result of these proceedings today that some common sense will
prevail and we can get back to an even keel, because both the
companies and the employees have suffered significant financial
loss.

It is unfortunate, Mr. Commissioner, I put to you and my
colleagues from the unions that these companies are involved in
such a serious dispute, because this is one of the sectors of the
metal trades industry which can be a growth sector; it does have
the capacity to employ additional people into the future, because
as you know they are involved in the resource development area,
particularly in relation to coal.

What has to be realised by the

unions and by the men on the job more particularly I suggest, is
that this will not occur, this will not become a growth sector for
additional employment if, as a result of direct action, or if we
are forced as a result of direct action, to shorter hours; it will
increase our costs to such an extent that equipment that these
companies manufacture can be purchased more cheaply overseas.
All of us in the metal trades industry, Mr. Commissioner - my
colleagues from the unions and ourselves - have seen, since the
mid-70's or earlier, what has happened to employment in this
industry when goods can be purchased on the world market more
cheaply than they can be made in Australia, people buy them, and
jobs go, and we are trying to avoid that.

The point I want to make for everybody to consider today is that
the equipment these companies make, that these men help make, is
all available on the world market and can be - and most likely
will be - purchased on the world market at world prices if this
dispute continues.

All we have seen happen since 1973-74 onwards

is that jobs that were formerly performed by Australian metal
workers are now being performed by metal workers overseas; we are
not interested in seeing that happen, we want to see the metal
trades industry grow and prosper and provide more jobs.

As you w i l l have seen, Mr. Commissioner, from the notification,
this dispute, along with the rest of the dispute in the m e t a l
trades industry, has been in existence since May, but generally
speaking it was escalated in August - earlier than that in one
particular company - to a nine-day fortnight with restrictions on
overtime, and particularly numerous bans which are designed to
impede the production are being faced in a number of companies,
and they are bans which range from the engagement of new labour,
bans on the use of sub-contractors, and so on.

A l l of this is

making it very difficult to produce properly.

As you would know from your general knowledge mass meetings of
m e t a l workers throughout Australia in the last week of October
resolved by 6300 votes to 4300 to suspend the general campaign,
that is the monthly campaign, so we are left with the situation
where the general campaign has been suspended and we are faced,
presumably, with what the ACTU metal trades unions determine as
their campaign.

This had some airing before the commission on

Wednesday, 22 October, as a result of a notification by the
national employers, of course of which my association was one.

I

w i l l just hand up to you, M r . Commissioner, the text of that
statement by the full bench; I have some here for my colleagues.
This is just a full text of that statement on Thursday, 23.
only wish to refer you to a couple of paragraphs on page 2 and
this is what the full bench said:

The ACTU agree that it was
co-ordinating the shorter

as a focal point for the
campaign.

This is important:

The ACTU also emphasize that
in those industries directly
was proceeding
without industrial action.

I

That is the point I want to make:

In respect of the metal industries
co-ordination of
the campaign.

As I said, the resolution was carried out and the ACTU is
presumably taking over this campaign, and if it is, in the ACTU;s
own words, and I was there to hear it, that the campaign that the
ACTU is waging is going to do so without industrial disputation
and the full bench acted on that and declined to act on the
national employers notification not to proceed with the national
wage case.

So what I am putting to you, you and the people in

the room, really is, that quite clearly now the great bulk of
metal workers throughout Australia will go back to normal work
after a year of disruption.

The great bulk of companies will be working normally, the great
bulk of employees will be receiving their normal pay and not
suffering any financial loss; and what we are trying to achieve as
a result of this notification, Mr. Commissioner, is that this same
situation, the general situation, apply in this sector.

It is

not in the interests of this sector, it is not in the interest of
the employees in it, as far as we are concerned, for them to be
the battering rams, to fight the campaign on behalf of some
mysterious body because it is clearly not on behalf of the ACTU.

We are hopeful that common sense will prevail, that the men will
go back to normal work, lift all their bans and let the ACTU
pursue their claim by the normal orderly methods that they
obviously intend to pursue.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Thank you, Mr. Evans.

Perhaps we could hear

the point of view of some of the trade union advocates.

MR. MAURICE:

Well, Mr. Commissioner, I would agree with Mr. Evans

that it is a serious dispute.

It has been as far as J

Manufacturing is concerned or the employees at J. Manufacturing
are concerned - a most serious dispute.

We have had a long history of disputation with this particular
company.

It has been their wont from time to time when the

employees of the metal trades unions put in a log of claims for
that company to say, and finally to agree, that once they have
paid the claims it flows on to other people within that particular
establishment and I might say, Mr. Commissioner, that it has been
a one way street for many years.

What has upset the employees particularly at J Manufacturing is
that when they put the reverse claim in indicating that quite a
substantial number of people in that establishment are working a
35-hour week and a 37 1/2 hour week, we were told the reverse does
not apply, and in fact we can go back over a number of years as to
where this has happened and where the claims have gone in and been
treated with scorn by the management.

So it now heartens me

somewhat that the metal trades industries association speaking on
their behalf now are concerned about the blood spilt by the
employees.

That is the first time, I think, that the company

have indicated their concern.

We would agree that in fact it is a growth sector.

As a matter

of fact that is another thing that is burning in the minds of our
members in all of the companies as I understand it, not only J but
all of the companies that are involved in this particular dispute,
because again while there are white collar workers and certain
office workers are enjoying a 35-hour and 37 1/2 hour week, and
their compatriots that work on the equipment that they make and
repair get a 35 hour week, they are expected to keep going on a
40-hour week.

So there is, as I say, a number of reasons why the campaign has
been continued in this particular sector.

I can assure you that

the mysterious body that Mr. Evans refers to is that vast crowd of
faceless employees who from day to day, year to year, front up at
the gates of the various establishments seeing that other people
within that employment sector in fact are, as I say, on less than
40 hours and the people who do most, in our view, to make sure
that the employers keep reaping in the profits are the people who
get the short end of the stick.

Now as far as the companies now using theat, and I take it as a
threat, of purchasing equipment overseas, well I can assure the
Metal Trades Industries Association and the employers if that is
the case and that threat is implemented, well then there are other
methods and means within the trade union movement to make sure
that when that equipment is bought and paid for, that it does not
get off the ship and we will be using every effort that we can
bring forward to make sure that that particular equipment stays
there and will finish up like the Flying Dutchman, it will be
going round and round the world and will not be able to find a
home.

Now as far as the ACTU is concerned, I appreciate the fact that
Mr. Evans of course deals fairly extensively with this part of the
trade union movement and I appreciate the fact that from time to
time when in the job that he is in, he has got to stretch his
imagination a little bit to make sure that the people he
represents get a better deal and from what I understand the
position to be from within the trade union movement that the 35
hour week campaign is not suspended; that in fact the efforts in
fact are being redirected and there are quite a number of industry
sectors that have been selected by the ACTU and the trade union
movement generlly to look at this 35-hour campaign and there has
been a number of meetings, as I understand it in all the various
shops that the employers are represented here today where they
have said in line with the sentiments that I have expressed that
they are prepared to be involved in this sector campaign that is
now being initiated.

So as has already been indicated, the growth industry is there and
it is exactly what we were talking about, about the 35-hour week
because unless employees receive some benefit of the technology
that they are now applying, well then I would suggest that if they
stayed on the 40-hour week, well then the jobs that are there now
will be quite less than what they would have been had they gone to
the 35-hour week because Mr. Evans of course would not tell you,
but I think it is pretty plain knowledge that employers have set
up a company in the ACT to advise all of the employers about the
technology that is available around the world.

As far as we are

concerned they are not backward in coming forward to avail
themselves of all the advice that is there for them to get.

So whether we put on a campaign for a 35-hour week or not,
employers, as they have done in the past, have of course availed
themselves of the technology that is available elsewhere and they
will implement it as soon as is possible to put as much money in
their pockets as they possibly can.

It stuns me, as a matter of fact - and I take a bit of stunning that the employers at J Manufacturing are complaining about some
bans that have been put on in respect of the 35-hour week.
I have always suspected that the communication gap at J.
Manufacturing has been fairly wide, but I did not know that it was
as wide as the Sydney Harbour heads, because I have got a list of
half a dozen bans that are allegedly in support of the 35-hour
week campaign, and it is not the fact at all.

In fact, I cannot

understand what on earth we are doing here because part of this
notice to the employees says:

We ask in return that all direct issues of the campaign be
maintained, for example the 9-day fortnight.

They agree with it.

However, all bans unique to this site are lifted immediately

There were a number of bans there, a half a dozen bans, that have
got nothing to do with the 35-hour week at all.

There is a

problem about car parking, there is a problem about casual labour,
there is a problem about obsolete machinery, there is a problem
about people using one-ton trucks as expediters, there is a
question of some logos in the inspection department, there is a
problem about - whatever this means - normal management/union
delegate discussions will be resumed in accordance with a laid
down disputes procedure to be issued.

As far as I am aware, while the delegates and the management might
not be able to agree, it has been my experience, Mr. Commissioner,
that the talks go on at J Manufacturing interminably; in fact, I
would suggest they probably have more discussions between
themselves, the delegates and the management, than three other
places that I could think of put together.

As I said, I just

cannot understand what all that is about.

In respect of the normal car parking arrangements, from what I can
understand the white collar workers are pinching some of the spots
that the local blokes, the tradesmen and trades assistants,
occupy, and that has been a blue that has been going on for some
time, because it is a dispute about availability of parking that
has been in existence for some time and in that particular area.
As a matter of fact their big brother across the road, Qantas,
that is a dispute that is going on there, and has been going on
for some time, because of the area that they are involved in,
where they have got their establishment.

In respect of their casual labour, there are a number of disputes
that have taken place over that in the past, and I think it will
continue to be so because of the way the company - the type of
people the company want, they want what is normally referred to in
the trade as body hire.

Of course, we have got objections about

that, and that is a separate dispute on its own.

As far as the obsolete machinery to be allowed to be replaced is
concerned, that relates to a problem that the company is intending
to move their premises.

We have been trying to corner the company

into a position where they are prepared to discuss the future of
the workers at J Manufacturing in Botany.

They have told us a

number of things from time, to time, that they are looking at
sites here, there and everywhere, trying to do deals with Qantas
and a couple of other places, and so what the lads are saying on
the job - and I believe quite rightly - that from their point of
view, you are not going to move any machinery out of this plant
until we know what our future is going to be.

I think that is a

fair enough assessment of the situation.

In respect of the other point that I made about an expediter
vehicle, they had a small panel van at one time, these expediters;
now they have got a one-ton truck.

I do now know what they are

supposed to do with a one-ton truck as an expediter; I do not
think they would get one of those coal mining machines into the
back of it, but apparently they must be going to try to get some
parts, and all we are saying in that dispute is that if they are
going to start carrying things around in a one-ton truck, well the
people that are driving them ought to be members of the union.

At

this stage I believe they employ a storeman-driver, but we are not
arguing who the people belong to, whether it is the storemen or
the transport workers union or whatever, as long as they join the
union they have not got a dispute.

The question of logos in the inspection department, I understand
that is a process whereby using chemicals the company burn in
their logo on to parts of machinery.

There again that is a safety

issue; that has been in question for quite some time and it has
been black-banned.

As I said I just cannot understand what on

earth we are doing here because, as I say, we have got a position
whereby, as far as the company is concerned, they say they respect
the campaign for a 35-hour week and do not intend to indulge in
provocative action. That was issued on 7 November, and here we are
on 10 November sitting around the court explaining our actions. If
you do not call that provocative, I do not know what was.

As far as we are concerned, we are prepared on a local basis - and
always have been - to sit around with the company and talk about
the problems on the job, and suggest within reason what can be
done to resolve those local problems; but in respect of the
35-hour week campaign, of course, as I say that decision had been
made.

I do not see it being unmade unless, of course, all of the

companies are prepared to sit around and discuss how we are going
to implement the 35-hour week for all of the employees in the
industry and not just part of them.

So that is the position as

we see it, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER:
helpful.

Thank you, Mr. Maurice, you have been most

I think it is common ground both on the side of the

employers and on the union side from the points that you have
expressed, that there are some types of bans and limitations on at
the moment.

Would that be true?

MR. MAURICE:

Yes, Mr. Commissioner, but it has got nothing to do

with the 35-hour week at all.

THE COMMISSIONER:

I am glad that you have cleared that up,

because in the notification that was received by the registry it
states:
The aforementioned employees are engaging in a campaign of
direct industrial action against the abovenamed employers in
the mining equipment industry sector of the metal trades
industry in support of a claim for a 35-hour week.

From

what you are saying, Mr. Maurice, the bans and limitations
are not in regard to a shorter working week, or shorter
hours, but to car parking, obsolete equipment or machinery,
an expediter vehicle, logos in the inspection department and
other issues; is that correct?

MR. MAURICE: That is at J Manufacturing at Moscot; I do not know
what bans are on in other areas.

There is quite a number of

companies which I do not normally visit in any case. As I said, I
only found out about this this morning around about 11 o'clock
and, as I understood a phone call that I got, it was only going to
be in respect of the J Manufacturing Company in any case, and it
surprised me to see the rest of the coal industry engineering
companies here.

THE COMMISSIONER: As far as your organisation is concerned, Mr.
Maurice, in J Manufacturing Company the campaign for shorter hours
is not being implemented here but, I think in your own words, is
being redirected by the ACTU in other places?

MR. MAURICE:

As far as the engineering sector in the coal mining

industry is concerned, there has been a meeting in quite a number
of companies - I think in all the ones that are mentioned on the
notification - and as far as those people are concerned they see
themselves as a group of workers directly allied to the coal
industry engineering sector and not to the general metal trades.
So their campaign in fact has been on the basis of workers
involved within that industry and whilst they were originally
involved in the metal industry campaign, they are now compaigning
on the basis of an industry sector in the coal industry.

THE COMMISSIONER:

In other words you are saying that part of the

problem then is shorter hours?

MR. MAURICE:

That is right.

THE COMMISSIONER:

MR. MAURICE:

And not only car parking, obsolete machinery.

I agree, as a matter of fact, I point out that the

company respects the campaign for the 35-hour week and does not
intend to take provocative action.

They say also:

We ask in return that a l l direct issues of the campaign be
maintained, for example the 9-day fortnight.

They are saying that it should be kept going; I did not write the
letter, the company did - it is signed by M r . J.W. Burns, Managing
Director.

As I said, I just cannot understand what the h e l l w e

are doing h e r e .

M R . EVANS:
I could.

M r . Commissioner, I wanted to remain silent as long as
That is one plant of J Manufacturing, there is the

other one at K u r r i , and then there are all the other companies
that my good friend M r . Maurice is just flossing over.

I took it

with a broad brush without going into it; there is a 9-day
fortnight in operation at a l l these companies, that is in
existance for a 35-hour week.

There are overtime restrictions in

existence at a l l these companies in direct support of a 35-hour
w e e k , and additionally there is a variety of bans which vary from
plant to plant.

Some of them M r . Maurice might be quite right

about, they have got a background going back; others are directly
related to the 35-hour week campaign.

There is no dispute

between u s .

M r . Maurice is trying to say that there is a special part there;
as far as w e are concerned they are part and parcel of the m e t a l
trades, they have hived off presumably thinking they are acting in
accordance with ACTU policy; we say they are not.

They are acting outside it, and their campaign of direct action is
outside the ACTU policy and should be called off.

THE COMMISSIONER:

From where I sit, M r . Evans, I am aware of ACTU

policy and certain decisions that we made by rank and file in
regard to the shorter hours campaign.

I am also aware - and I am quite sure that everyone present in the
commission today is aware - that the matter of shorter hours is
one that must be dealt with in another place in another manner,
and if any part of the claim is aimed at shorter hours then
obviously the correct procedure by the union or unions concerned
is to make application in the proper manner so that it will be
dealt with by the authority which is competent in accordance with
the act to deal with it.

Now, as far as the commission as presently constituted is
concerned, I most certainly would do everything that I can to
assist the parties in resolving problems such as car parking,
obsolete machinery and so on if, in fact, those disputes exist but
as far as the shorter working hours is concerned I am stressing
that the appropriate way of handling that, and I am speaking to
the unions now, is to make the appropriate application.

Now, if we have these other problems on the one hand that the
union or unions design to have resolved then let us look at that
as a problem but at the moment I am trying to find out to what
extent the company's notification in regard to shorter working
hours is being pressed by the unions and perhaps we can see where
we can go on the matter of shorter hours in that area if that is
where the problem is.

Perhaps we could hear from some of the

other unions.

MR. MURADA:

Thank you Commissioner; I might be able to enlighten

you on three of those areas, as a matter of fact, I am personally
associated with.

One is V, M and T's and there is certainly a

campaign there, yes.

These people for some time - as a matter of

fact it has been 30 years since the 40-odd hours working week was
brought in to Australia wide.

Productivity compared to output per worker is virtually double.
Employees naturally enough have not received the same benefits as
their employers and particularly the companies as here, they are
repair and manufacturing industries, and there is no doubt they
have not got to look too far to see other people in virtually the
same industry or certainly in the coal raining industry in relation
to a 35-hour week.
a number of years.

Those people have enjoyed a 35-hour week for
And the particular people involved have met.

They have met on several occasions, not just on one occasion.
They have changed their tactics since late as last week.

I can

assure you I was at T's in Port Kembla and they - in what Mr.
Evans said it is not 100 per cent true because it is not due to
start till next week although the intentions may be there.

But

nevertheless the fortnight - or the nine-day fortnight - is
supposed to commence as of next week and they certainly - I think
that out of something like 100 people, I better reduce that
figure, something like 60 people voted and there was three against
it so I might add it was almost a unanimous decision that a
nine-day fortnight be in fact worked and unless those people lift
those requests I am afraid - it was by their own decision they
made that.

The same as at M , the same at V Engineering.

I

believe J is about to move into that area but I am not too sure
about that personally.

Once again, Commissioner, as far as I am

concerned these people have their own people in the coal raining
industry enjoying a 35 hour, in fact, receiving a 35 hour and they
certainly do not want to be the only people in that area that - on
that basis of over the mountain as we call it and down at Port
Kembla they do intend to pursue the policy.

It would appear that the ACTU is going to come into it as has been
indicated here.

They will be - as a matter of fact it has been

laid to one particular union that the present campaign be
organised by that union and in relation to all other unions in
those sectors and they are receiving full co-operation.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Thank you, Mr. Murada.

It would appear to me

just as there was a reduction of working hours from 48 to 44 hours
some years ago and in more recent times from 44 to 40, then I
would think it inevitable that hours will be shortened in some way
at some time in the future on a standard basis.

As to whether it

will be a 35 hour week or a nine day fortnight or something else I
do not know and as I indicated earlier it will not be this type of
hearing that is going to give it,

I do not know whether the members of your union employed in these
companies imagine that the company is going to hand it on a plate
to them outside the commission or not, but again, I would say to
you that the appropriate way to handle this matter is for an
application to be made for variation of the award and when you
mention the fact that productivity has increased well there is one
argument among many, no doubt, that you would be aware of that you
could use in such an application, particularly in view of the
introduction of new technology; but as far as the commission as
presently constituted is concerned, as I have said before, I am
not in the position to be able to assist the unions there.

Do I take it that that is the only issue in these places that you
are covering is shorter working hours and not other matters such
as car parking etcetera?

MR. MURADA:

To my knowledge that is the present campaign, Mr.

Commissioner.

MR. COCHRAN:

Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Evans has stated that people

in the mine manufacturing are part of the general metal industry
award sector, but the people in the mining manufacture midway
through the general campaign saw that they were different, they
had seen the line the glass industry was taking whereby disputes,
by stoppages, the people in the glass industry could get the
employees around a table to talk, then to come to the commission
to seek their help in setting up joint working parties so that
they could consult on how to attain a shorter working week within
that industry.

Now, the people in the mining manufacturing could see that they
were something special, the general standard within that type of
industry was for a shorter working week, whether it be 35 - but it
was less than 40, so they decided to call all the employees within
that area to meetings to break away from the general metal trades
campaign as it was and to up their campaign to try and get the
employees around the table.

I agree with what my colleagues say that the unions are always
prepared to sit around the table and talk because I think that a
lot of good can come out of talking, by conciliation rather than
by arbitration.

You only have to look at how the glass industry

has come a long way down the line to where they have Commissioner
Vosti helping and they have now come to a stage where they are
going to have inspections I believe within that industry, and that
is why the people in the mining manufacturing have upped their
campaign to try to get the people to sit down and talk.

They

believe that they are different from the general metal trades and
that is why they have upped their campaign but they still believe
they are apart from the general campaign.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cochran, again I refer to the notification
by the Metal Trades Industry Association in which we are now
notified that the claim for a 35 hour week has been rejected by
the employers. I do not know the history of that rejection, but
perhaps I could ask Mr. Evans: Is there a reluctance by the
employers to get around the table to discuss this matter, to do
something similar to what may have been originally done in the
glass industry?

MR. EVANS: As we said in the glass industry, we are prepared to
talk to anybody at any time, the fact is we are not talking at the
moment in the glass industry because the employees considered they
would continue with a campaign of direct action and we said, good,
we can have as much direct action as you like but you will not get
any talks.

So, ray friend is wrong about the glass industry, it has now
reached a stalemate after 7 months of fairly massive direct action
and loss from both sides so there are no talks at all in the glass
industry.

Our position here is we will talk until we are blue in the face
but it will be talking to convince them to drop their claim.
There is no way in the world - we do not mind doing that, we can
convince them, we have all the arguments in the world - there is
no way in the world we are going to sit around a table and concede
reduced hours.

These discussions have taken place with individual companies over
the period and it is partly the industry and it is partly the
association.

The members who are here today, their view has been

put nationally that this matter can be resolved in a normal
orderly way by the metal trades unions or the ACTU seeking to file
a general application for hours or as you quite rightly suggest,
Mr. Commissioner, they could file an application for hours in this
industry.
who are

There are more than six companies, they are the ones

principally concerned today, but we would welcome any

case which we would argue in the proper place about reduced hours
and all we are trying to do is say that is one way of doing it,
that is a sensible way to do it, it is not sensible for these
blokes to be virtually the only shock troops in Australia.

THE COMMISSIONER:

it seems to me, Mr. Evans, there are three main

ways of doing it; one is to go along with ACTU policies and
activity, the other is seek a variation of this award and the
other way is to do what they are doing at the moment.

Now,

frankly I cannot see that the current method is being successful
nor is it likely to be successful, particularly as you have been
quite frank in answering the question that I posed and that is
were you prepared to talk and you said yes, you were prepared to
talk but you were going to tell them that you were not going to
give.

Well I do not think that is what they are looking for.
had a bit of experience in trade union matters.

I have

I would like to

see the parties get together if for no other purpose than to work
out a programme to allow the unions to make the proper application
to the commission for a variation of the award.

That is what I

would like to see; but that is entirely up to the unions who at
this moment appear to be looking at one of the alternatives.
Perhaps I might ask Mr. Grantham would he like to add anything.

MR. GRANTHAM:

Yes, Commissioner, I think Mr. Evans should realise

that the ACTU clearly identifies the mining equipment as a
separate entity as distinct from the general metal trades spectrum
of industry which is pretty broad across Australia.

Now, the

ACTU condones the campaign and the campaign the boys are doing out
there at J is virtually in line with the ACTU policy and to go
outside the ACTU policy would be to virtually try and take the
campaign out of their hands when unionists throughout Australia
are lining up behind the ACTU's campaign for the shorter working
week.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Perhaps you might tell us exactly what is the

ACTU policy?

MR. GRANTHAM:

It is a 70 hour 9 day fortnight.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Yes, but what is the method that the ACTU

proposes to adopt to achieve their purpose.

MR. GRANTHAM:

Action on the shop floor in selected industries.

THE COMMISSIONER:

MR. GRANTHAM:

Is this one of the selected industries?

Yes it is, it comes in group 3 of the ACTU policy.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Does the company agree with that?

M R . EVANS:

A l l I am saying is somebody had the full bench o n .

I

was there when the ACTU advocate said these words that I read to
you.

The ACTU emphasised that in those industries directly

co-ordinated by it the claim for a shorter working week was
proceeding without industrial action.

N o w , if the ACTU does not

mean what it says I suppose it is a matter for another place.

THE COMMISSIONER:

M R . GRANTHAM:

Are you sure of your facts, Mr. Grantham?

I have a circular here that says it is part of a

list of 32 industries, the ACTU, divided into three groups.

M R . COCHRAN:

May I say something, commissioner?

THE COMMISSIONER:
M R . COCHRAN:

Yes.

What M r . Evans said the ACTU delegate to the full

bench said is probably right, but I w i l l repeat that the mining
manufacturer broke away from the general metal trades industry 35
hour a week campaign about half way through it.

Now they have

decided they are separate, that they are an area that can break
through.

I believe that they were not involved in the stoppages

last week because they have decided the action they w i l l take.

THE COMMISSIONER:

We are at cross purposes, Mr. Cochran.

What I

am trying to find out is whether the ACTU imagines that this
industry is one of the selected industries that the ACTU is
involved w i t h .

M R . COCHRAN:

W e l l , none of the areas as under the general m e t a l

trades campaign have been called together as yet.
the unions to co-ordinate those meetings.

That is up to

As I said the mining

manufacture had started before the ACTU was called in to
co-ordinate the campaign.
THE COMMISSIONER:
together?

The ACTU has not called the relevant industries

M R . COCHRAN:

No.

THE COMMISSIONER:

But is this particular industry on the list to

your knowledge?

M R . COCHRAN:

Y e s , they are on the list but they have not been

called together under the auspices of the ACTU

THE COMMISSIONER:

M R . COCHRAN:

But they w i l l be called together?

I believe they w i l l commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Are these industries and the unions concerned

going to be involved in the ACTU campaign in these selected areas?
M R . COCHRAN:

It is a strange fact of life, Mr. Commissioner, that

y o u can go to people and say that they should become involved in a
certain campaign and then you try and talk until you are blue in
the face and those people w i l l decide that they will, you k n o w , do
the opposite of what you put up.

Mr. Evans said why should this

group of employers bear the brunt of the campaign when a l l the
others have pulled out.

There are a number of shops that are

still pursuing the 35 hour week or a shorter working w e e k .

THE COMMISSIONER:

But, Mr. Cochran, you cannot have it both w a y s .

Either you are part of the ACTU campaign which I think M r .
Grantham was saying you are, or, on the other hand, run your own
race.

M R . COCHRAN:

They have not been called together under the

auspices of the ACTU as yet, Mr. Commissioner.
there they can t e l l the ACTU where to go.

Once they get

A lot of our people

t e l l us where to g o , too; any union official has not had a perfect
record of being able to convince these people that they should do
certain action.

M R . MAURICE: M r . Commissioner, the position should be quite
obviously plain, that as M r . Evans had indicated this is a new
South Wales dispute. It is not an interstate dispute in which the
ACTU in fact can intervene. Now, if it becomes interstate then I
have no doubt that the ACTU w i l l probably call the unions
together.

At this stage it is companies which are mostly J

Manufacturing, they own J . Manufacturing, they also own the place
u p at K u r r i K u r r i and I understand w i l l own V Engineering very
shortly.

The majority of it is one company, it has spread from

the company, there is a number of other people involved in the
like industries that have got themselves involved into the
campaign.

As I said it is a New South Wales dispute, it has been
orchestrated, if you like, by that mysterious body that I referred
to before that M r . Evans did not seem to know anything about,
those blokes in the blue overalls who said that they want the 35
h o u r week the same as everybody else who works in the industry
whether they work on the machines in the pits o r whether they work
o n the machines up on top of the pits or whether they work in the
offices of those companies they are employed with; they want an
equal go like everybody else.

I can understand the problem of

trying to sort a l l this o u t , J. Manufacturing management has a bit
of trouble organising just to get together with the 45 unions in
the place to talk about ordinary problems which they cannot solve
and which I have read out so I have no doubt why there is some
confusion.

If they try to organise all of the rest of the

companies together to talk about or not to talk about a 35 hour
w e e k , I can understand we are in the confused situation.

T h e plain fact of the matter is that the employees over many, many
months have decided initially they would be in the m e t a l industry
campaign; they then decide as has already been indicated that
because of the unfairness of the situation - the office workers
and the rest of the blue collar workers in the industry are on a
35 hour w e e k , some on 35 some on less than 4 0 , they should be part
of it too and they have banded together to argue on a combined
basis.

N o w , that is not an unusual thing to do, in fact, we wish it would
happen more often and it is a rank and file campaign and has been
indicating it is rolling fairly successfully otherwise the
employers would not be down here crying tears of blood.

So, to

say that it is not successful I think is a bit of MOr. Evans'
double talk that he uses from time to time when you have him on
the ropes and gasping he says he is not feeling the punch.

S o , as far as w e are concerned, that is the position, M r .
Commissioner, as far as those half a dozen points that I read out
are concerned, we have indicated to management we are prepared to
sit down around the table and talk to you about it, I cannot
understand what it has to do with all the rest of the people ---

M R . EVANS:

They have all got strikes.

M R . MAURICE:

If that is the basis of the argument for a 35 hour

week - half a dozen points that have been outlined to us to a l l
employees of J and I read things as I see them, it says:

J . Manufacturing - to a l l employees

I took that to cover the people at V Engineering and the people up
in Kurri Kurri, if that is not the case then obviously that is a
local matter which we w i l l fix u p , but if it is a position of
sitting down and trying to convince us that we ought to c a l l off
the 35 hour campaign w e l l then, as far as I am concerned, I have
got plenty of work to do other than stand around spruiking here
a l l day.

I am prepared to drop right off now because I am not

going to sit around the table to have some people who in their own
employ have people working on a 35 hour week.

The M e t a l Trades

Industry Association w i l l understand all of their employees work a
35 hour week - for them to sit around and tell us we have to p u l l
the campaign off - as far as I am concerned that is not on and if
the conference is just to do that then as I said, as far as I am
concerned I am wasting my time and everybody else's.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can anyone see the advantage of going into
private conference with the advocates?
MR. EVANS: While Mr. Maurice is thinking about it, I know he lives
near J but I wish he would get it out of his mind, he is not just
talking about J , he is talking about all these companies and all
the employees.

As I said before, we are happy to go into

conference but the purpose of our talk in conference w i l l be to
persuade them to get back to normal.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Let me put it another way Mr. Evans: this was a

notification by your association.

What is it that you are asking

the commission to do.
MR. EVANS:

I think what you said, Mr. Commissioner, to recommend

to them and you have said it, if they think they have a genuine
claim that they should file an application to vary the award and
conduct it in the normal way the system provides and while that is
being conducted, to call off direct action.
THE COMMISSIONER: You would appreciate that I can do little more
than that.
MR. EVANS:

That is all, but if you would recommend that we think

that the men would take notice of what you put.
THE COMMISSIONER:
MR. MAURICE:

I so recommend.

Before you do, Mr. Commissioner, I am getting a bit

confused now, because I have a letter here that says:
The company respect the campaign
for the 35 hour week
for example the 9 day fortnight.

Now, here we have the Metal Trades Industries Association saying
that for all of this the employers to call it off, asking you to
call it off.

I have a letter signed by the managing director of

three of the four companies involved saying
MR. EVANS:

No, signed by one, J. Manufacturing.

MR. MAURICE:
MR. EVANS:

Who owns V Engineer and Kurri Kurri --It does not.

MR. MAURICE:

--- it is all the same company.

THE COMMISSIONER:
MR. MAURICE:

You have got me confused now.

He has got me very confused.

He is asking for the

Metal Trades Industries Association - he is asking for a
recommendation to call off the campaign.

Now, as I said, in

three of the establishments that are involved in it, we have got a
letter to say the campaign should go on signed by the managing
director.

Can I ask now, is the recommendation only going to be

to those companies other than J Manufacturing or those
subsidiaries that they represent.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Could you read out the relevant portion of that

letter to me?
MR. MAURICE:

I will hand a copy up.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Mr. Evans, can you help me with clause 6 and

tell me what it means.
MR. EVANS:

I would say this is just a use of English - you could

put it another way

Yes, the managing director here is

confronted with a situation where none of these bans were on,
Laurie Carmichael turned up at my friend's request.

He address es a. ineeting and suddently we get all the bans on so we
have got that.

The second situation Is, in the middle of a

campaign the managing director of this company, Mr. Burns, is
realistic enough to think that these blokes at J will not call it
off unilaterally so he has gone out and spoken to them all and
said, "l am prepared to make certain concessions to get us back to
normal" - because it is not a normal situation at J it is
absolutely abnormal and I think they lead the race in this
particular environment and I think it would be reasonable to say
they have more trouble than any of the other companies.
The Managing Director of this particular company says, look, I
will bend a bit to see if you can get back to normal like all the
other companies.

It is bad enough to be like all the other

companies, it is worse to be out on our own
THE COMMISSIONER:
MR. EVANS:

Meaning a 9 day fortnight?

Meaning to get all the other bans off and while there

is a 9 day fortnight on all the other companies he was realistic
enough to know that the blokes at J will not pull it off on their
own.
THE COMMISSIONER:
MR. EVANS:

That answers the question for me.

That is all he said.

Now, if we get them all off, if

Company blokes pull it off we want the J Blokes to pull it off as
well.

That is all he had said, he spoke to the blokes himself,

he said, look I am right here to ask you blokes unilaterally to
dump your mates, I know if it is going to go on you will be in it.
THE COMMISSIONER:

It appears to me that what he is saying, is

lift all the other bans but leave the 9 day fortnight ban there.
MR. EVANS:

Only because he is realistic enough to know that the

blokes will not lift upon their own.
THE COMMISSIONER:

Realistic or not, that is what he has done.

M R . EVANS:

That is all.

THE COMMISSIONER:

And the question has now been p u t , where do

they stand in the light of

M R . EVANS:

He wants it off, he would like it o f f , but he realises

he would not get it off on his own and he has not gone out to the
blokes and said, I w i l l try and buy you out, one out.

THE COMMISSIONER:
M R . EVANS:

He is only speaking of one company is not he?

He is speaking of J Manufacturing Company who have a

plant here at Mascot which my friend is pre-occupied with and
K u r r i and they are both very troublesome.

M R . MAURICE:
M R . EVANS:

And V Engineering.
He does not own V Engineering.

M R . MAURICE:

M R . EVANS:

He w i l l in November.

He might, he does not own it, it is a separate legal

entity and they are represented here today, so this is the manager
of one company taking a very practical approach with hard nosed
blokes and he has not stood up and said I want you to c a l l it off;
h e simply said get back and only be as bad as all the others are.

M R . MAURICE:

M R . EVANS:

W e l l , w e w i l l do that.

Get a l l the bans off is a start.

M R . GRANTHAM:

May I speak, Mr. Commissioner?

THE COMMISSIONER:
M R . GRANTHAM:
3.

Y e s , M r . Grantham.

This is the ACTU policy in this, I w i l l list group

It is that group which the metal
industry campaign committee ....
ship building
and there are a couple of other industries there.

It has been

broken into three sections which says:

the first section were those
industries
and agricultural implement industry.
S o , the policy is in line
THE COMMISSIONER:

Whose circular is that?

THE COMMISSIONER:

I do not want to see it, it is from your union.

M R . GRANTHAM:

Y e s , it is a copy of what the ACTU is.

THE COMMISSIONER:
can do today.

As I see it, there seems to be little that I

I would repeat my earlier statement that the

proper way for the matter of shorter hours to be attended to by
the trade unions is to make appropriate application to the
commission for a variation of the award, or alternatively to fall
in with whatever the ACTU decides, which may w e l l be some kind of
a test case.

In addition to that I believe it would be to the advantage of all
the parties if some kind of a conference were arranged between the
appropriate organisations for the purpose of discussing this
matter at least, so that something may emerge as to the future
development of the issue and hopefully the resolution of the bans
and limitations.
Apart from that there is very little we can do today and the
commission now stands adjourned

AT 3 . 2 1 P.M. THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED

-

INDEFINITELY
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F MANUFACTURING COMPANY DISPUTE AS NOTIFIED
TO THE CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION COMMISSION
ON 23RD FEBRUARY, 1981.

BACKGROUND SUMMARISED
I consider that the best overall view of this dispute can be
achieved by dividing events which commenced in April, 1980 to
today, into four parts, viz.:

1.

May to 29th September, 1980.

2.

30th September, 1980 to 31st October, 1980.

3.

1st November, 1980 to 31st December, 1980.

4.

1st January, 1981 to Current Date.

A limited build u p campaign had been in operation for a
considerable period prior to A p r i l 1980 in the form of walk outs
and go slow tactics as part of "a softening up process."

BACKGROUND EXPANDED

The actions/counteractions which have occurred in each of the
above periods can be viewed from an Employer o r Unionist aspect.
Attached hereto for each of the periods as set out above with
supporting documentation as an appendicy are listings of key
events which have occurred.

THE ISSUES
In a dispute as protracted as this matter has been, it is often
difficult in retrospect to clearly define what ultimately is an
issue but in m y v i e w , the issues are as follows:

1-

Union Activities at F Manufacturing Company
Since M a y , members of the A.M.W.S.U., F.I.A., A.S.E. and in
some instances, Storemen and Packers and Electrical Trades
Union have engaged in activities contrary to the M e t a l
Industry Award as part of a campaign for a 35 hour week.

The overall reason for engaging in these activities seems no
longer to be important but rather the extent of and type of
activity being engaged in (examples of which are listed
hereunder) and their effect upon the Company's operations are
important.

Examples of the limitations mentioned above are:
9 day fortnight (36 hour week).
Complete ban on overtime.

Complete ban on the subcontracting of w o r k .

Complete ban on the despatch of finished goods.

A b a n on the employment of new labour.

A ban on the filling out of time tickets.

A work to rule within classification limitation.
A ban on the introduction of shift work in the Fitting
Shop.

2.

Company's Response to the Bans and Limitations Imposed

Throughout this dispute the Company has maintained that the
correct approach from the Unions for gaining of reduced hours
should be by application for a variation of the appropriate
award or through an A.C.T.U. promoted test case.

The Company in taking a stand supportive of the system has
attempted to maintain production in spite of the Trade Union
activities.

The Company now claims that it should be allowed to produce
its goods and services without Union inspired hindrance.

Initially the Company reacted to the Union imposed
limitations by attempting to re-organise its production by
increasing labour capacity through introduction of additional
shifts and/or to meet commitments to customers by maintenance
of a practice introduced late in 1979 of subcontracting
orders which had become time critical.

As the Unions' campaign intensified subsequently the Company
took the following actions:

a.

As part of the Mining Equipment Manufacturers, the
Company approached the Arbitration Commission for
assistance.

b.

The Company wrote letters to employees in an attempt to
set down the damaging effects to the Company of the
method being adopted by the Unions.

c.

The Company attempted to overcome specific bans and
limitations but was forced into a "no work - no pay"
situation by the Unionists.

d.

Section 25 (e) of the Metal Industry Award was applied
with respect to the strike of the 8th December, 1980.

e.

Employees have been stood down once they could not be
usefully employed.

f.

The Company;s losses in 1980 were $3,900,000 and best
estimate, approximately $1,000,000 can be attributed to
this dispute.

RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE

The Company seeks a return to good industrial relations which it
considers can only be achieved by:

1.

The lifting of all bans and limitations by Unions.

2.

That a Company re-structuring made necessary as a result of
this dispute take place smoothly even though the Company will
have to terminate a number of employees to achieve both a
trading back to profitability and guaranteed job security for
the remaining workforce.

3.

Negotiation to commence about specific conditions of
employment consistent with the Company's re-structuring.

4.

The establishment of proper relations between Management and
Union Officials.

To achieve the above, the Company with reluctance is prepared to
reserve its decision with respect to the application of Section
25(e) of the Metal Industry Award and is of course prepared to
withdraw the stand down notices to allow a resumption of work.

APPENDIX A.4

A Typical Letter to Clients
from Company F concerning the
Industrial Dispute

Appendix A.4

19th February, 1981.
Dear Sir,

F Manufacturing Company, as a major supplier of equipment to the
mining and allied industries has been subjected, since May, 1980,
to the metal Unions' campaign for a reduced working week.

This

campaign has been intensified since October to include not only
one day stoppages every fortnight, but also rolling strikes,
overtime bans, bans on sub-contracting of work, bans on shift
work, bans on employment and work to rule limitations.

W e have been informed that J Manufacturing Company, for reasons
best known to themselves have offered to their employees a 36 1/2
hour week from 1st March, 1981 with a phasing in of a 35 hour week
by 1st March 1982.

This action has been taken in spite of the

Federal Government's expressed concern on the 35 hour issue and
the M.T.I.A.'s application to bring the issue before a Full Bench
of the Arbitration Commission.

Naturally F is concerned at the

potential on-going effect of arrangements made outside the
Arbitration Commission on Australian manufacturing companies and
on industries which they service.

The F Manufacturing Company, over the past 15 years, has played a
major part in the development and local manufacture of equipment
for the Australian mining industry.

Such equipment includes:

Mine Rovers
Universal Transporters
Diesel Powered Underground equipment.
Underground and Mineral Exploration Drills
Mine Ventilation Fans
Hoists and Winders.
Personnel Transport Cars.
Flat Top Transporters.
Ore Trucks

Stone Dusting Equipment
Feeder Breakers
Roof Bolting and Timbering Equipment.
Aircraft Towing Tractors.
Conveyors.

In addition, the Company has expended large sums on the
modification of products originally developed overseas, e.g. the
Continuous Miner, in order to make such products compatible with
Australian mining requirements.

Unfortunately, the losses suffered and the on-going costs arising
out of this campaign by the Unions have forced us to review the
basis of our operations.

This w i l l mean a rationalisation of o u r

product range and a minimising of our role in research and
development of mining equipment products.

Further, w e shall be

limiting our participation as principal contractor in major
Australasian materials handling projects and inevitably in the
export market.

W e w i l l be in contact with you in the near future regarding the
implications of the above on our future operations and the impact
o n our range of available products.

General Manager,
Australasian Operations.

APPENDIX A.5

Progress Report on Major Export
Project Illustrating Effect of
Industrial Unrest Between the
Period 1976 and 1981
and

Correspondence between Company

Client and Company F

Appendix A.5
PROGRESS REPORT ON MAJOR EXPORT PROJECT
ILLUSTRATING EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST
PERIOD 1976 - 81

INVITATION TO TENDER
New Zealand Electricity Commission issued invitations to tenderers
for the supply and construction of a coal handling plant
associated with a major power generation plant.

The tenderers

were asked to return submissions for December 1974 with full
details of the basis of design proposed including NZ content and
overseas content.

The enquiry called for a fixed price contract

subject only to C.P.I, and Industrial Award increases for the
period of the contract.

It was envisaged that the contract

period would be some two years from the date of awarding the
contract subject only to a design approval period nominally six
months from the date of issue of the tender documents.

BASIS OF DESIGN

The basis for design of structures was NZ Standard 1900 which
provided for the protection of structures from earthquake.

This

standard included the effects from fire as a result of earthquake
damage.

Noise level and visual aspects of the structure proposed

was to be examined and approved by the Electricity Commission.

AWARD OF CONTRACT
Due to delays beyond the control of the contractors/tenderers, a
decision to award a contract to the selected tenderer was not made
u n t i l May 1974 when company "F" were nominated as the successful
tenderers following protracted discussion since January 1975.
The contract time allowed for completion of the project was two
years subject to budget limitations imposed by the N . Z . Treasury.

DATE OF CONTRACT FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES
Upon receipt of official notification to proceed with the contract
to operate and control the project.

The official project date

for the purposes of establishing the critical path for the
contract was set as June 1975.

This required that the

mobilisation of design staff, sub-contract allocation,
manufacturing and assembly, including advance orders for
specialised items would be finalised and in position by no later
than September 1975.

MONTHLY PROGRESS
The progress of the contract is set out showing the reason and
background to delays where appropriate.

JUNE 75 - SEPT 75

Basic design prepared for approval by the client with reference to
the original tender documents.

This period was used to provide

sufficient design details to satisfy the relevant authorities that
the design would meet the environmental, planning and standards
required.

Such approval is normal in a major project and forms

the basis for detail design of foundations, services and
coordination with other contractors in the field.

DEC 75 - APRIL 76
The client indicated a major change to the original c o a l
specification for the power station due to seam quality changes in
the supply situation.
Extensive modifications to the coal handling plant were required
which affected foundation details.

As most of the foundation

work was excluded from the coal handling plant contract this would
delay access to the site.
delay of some eight months.

As w i l l be noted, this amounted to a

SUMMARY OF DELAYS AT DESIGN STAGE
DEC 75 - SEPT 76
DELAY
MONTHS

1.

Coal quality design change

5

2.

Foundation design change and lack of site access

2

3.

Notification of change to earthquake code -

halt in detail design.

1

Total

8

SEPT 1976
The client notified the contractor of changes to the original
design Standard NZ1900/Page C164 Structural Design.

A revised

code NZ4203/1976 (draft form only) would require change to the
design already approved and completed in order to meet the new
seismic standards.

a)

The changes included:

Dynamic analysis to be made on the behaviour of structures
proposed when under the influence of seismic activity.

b)

Post elastic analysis.

c)

All bolted connections to be designed on the basis that the
original of 1.2 times the work load would now be based upon
1.2 times the incoming load i.e. the load generated by
individual members in order to comply with b).

Bow's Notation
Pin Jointed Frame

(d)

Foundation design modified to conform to the code since 1976,
would be treated as members.

SEPT 76 - APRIL 77

This period created further delays to the contract programme as
the new design required approval of the client prior to proceeding
with manufacture.

In addition the contract called for approval

of any changes to the contract value.

This item must be closely

examined by managers and supervisors in any project.

MAY 1977

Following approval of the structural changes required to meet the
new NZ 4203/1976, the clients architect requested aesthetic
changes to the bracing of trestles.

This included a design

change to the cladding originally approved.

In the case of the

cladding the client believed that this would result in a cost
reduction.

Such design requirements requested by the client do

not necessarily reflect a direct cost reduction and the contractor
proceeded with the work subject to price difference negotiation.

Details of design changes are set out below as an indication of
the engineering/management/financial

aspects of a project and do

not necessarily reflect the true cost of change.

The estimated price variation of $40,704 must be examined from the
site management and project management viewpoint.

The following

chain of events occur:

a)

Contractor notified of proposed variation.

b)

Site management examines the nature of change and where this
fits in with programme - estimated time loss or gain,

c)

Design engineer prepared modified plan.

(d)

Process officer obtains costing if new material required.

(e)

Accountant costs change.

(f)

Notify client of cost effect.

(g)

Site management notifies sub-contractor etc.

(h)

Approval from client.

DECEMBER 1977
Due to financial restraint imposed by the N.Z. Treasury the
contractor was committed to re-programme the work on the basis of
a 12 month delay in the delivery of coal to the bunkers for the
testing and commissioning of the system.

Although this was

seemingly a matter of adjustment of programme the seam quality
which would be delivered was such that the transfer stations would
require re-design.
The implications of change must be carefully examined by project
managers and the prolongation claims arising from such occurrences
can often be a cause of loss of credibility of a contracting
company and may result in loss of business.
Appendix sets out typical examples of the type of negotiation and
legal disputation which follows and should be used a guide to
managers.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
DECEMBER 1977
The effects of industrial disputes are not only financial and it
is very difficult to retain the confidence of a client where a
major trade union engages in a campaign for increased benefits
both financial and improved working conditions.

The contract under review was at a critical stage when the Metal
Workers Union commenced industrial action against the contractor
on the basis of a full order book.

Where an extension of time is sought by the contractor due to
industrial troubles, the client's first step is to recommend that
the work be contracted out of the disputed arena in order to avoid
prolongation.

Such a procedure if it is possible to achieve, w i l l inevitably be
to the cost of the contractor since the client is uninvolved.

In

most cases where a large trade union is involved, there w i l l be an
embargo placed on any firm undertaking to do the work.

This particular industrial section was not a dispute however, and
the client accepted that "force majeur" could be applied to permit
some prolongation of the contract provided that the contractor
only claimed Consumer Price Authority increases for work completed
but no claims for overtime or bonus payment would be recognised.

From December 1977 u n t i l the completion of the contract in 1980
the relationship between client and contractor became increasingly
strained due to the lack of progress on the project and this is
highlighted b y the examples of correspondence in appendix ????

CHANGE OF D E S m -

FIGURE A.5

FLOWPATH

OVERSEAS CLIENT CHANGE OF D E S I G N F L O W P A T H

T h e NZ Electricity Commission remained aloof from the site
operations from an industrial point of view, but the local unions
strongly supported their Australian counterparts and generally
operated on a go slow/overtime ban and intermittent stop work
meetings similar to the tactics used at the base factory in
Australia.

It is considered that any Australian company involved in an
overseas venture, i.e. outside Australia including N Z , w i l l
require to research the strength of local trade unions and also to
include in the future a set of conditions of payment for
prolongation.

These conditions indicate clearly that a very firm overall review
o f a project must be maintained concurrent with the work in
progress.

The use of a computer aided work m o d e l is believed to

b e essential to protect the interests of client and contractor.

There can be no room for site compromise without pre-conditions,
and experience in the mining, civil and mechanical industries in
Australia today highlight the lack of foresight in management and
in market research.

Reference to the trade figures show the marked decline in economic
performance w h i c h is the major problem facing Australia.

BULK HANDLING MATERIALS CONTRACT

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE - RECORD A T YEAR 4
Fixed price with Inflation Index allowance
allowed in sum for 2 year period

$A to $NZ exchanged rate clause included.
10% bank credit guarantee against delivery
conditions.
Value of contract $A16,738,000 (1986 adjusted)
$A1000s

SALES
(CONTRACT
YEAR

VALUE
DISBURSED)

BEFORE TAX

COSTS
FORECAST

ACTUAL

PROFIT

TAX
PROVISION

NETT
PROFIT/LOSS

1

1,089

-

858

231

116

116

2

6,115

-

5,055

1,060

530

530

3

6,228

4,829

6,277

(-49)

(699)

(-49)

4

3,306

3,034

3,944

(-638)

(272)

(-638)

7,863

16,134

1,291

1,617

646

16,738

-687

971

604

604

646

T h e losses in years 3 and 4 and Warranty year 5 debited against
t o t a l company profits.

Tax provision deducted from profits year

4,5,6.
T h e financial performance prepared at year 4 shows the budget
position prepared at year 4 for the purpose of forward planning of
expenditure.

The costs include:- LABOUR
MATERIAL
FABRICATION
SUB-CONTRACT PAYMENT
TRANSPORT

debited directly to the contract account,

A LETTER FROM OVERSEAS CLIENT TO COMPANY F

Company F Performance

At our meeting on 4 and 5 December 1980 it was agreed that Coal to
stockout plant would be deemed sufficiently complete for the fine
tuning to commence as at 5.12.80 and that the takeover certificate
would be issued 30 project working days after that date subject to
all outstanding items being completed.

It was also agreed that a

similar course of action be pursued on the Coal to Bunker plant,
except that the plant had yet to be completed sufficiently for
fine tuning to commence.

Since December 1980 outstanding work on the coal handling project
has been closely monitored and the matter of completing
outstanding items has been the subject of continual review between
New Zealand Electricity site staff and F Sydney (Mr. J. Barrett).
Despite persistent endeavours by New Zealand Electricity to
expedite progress on the lists of outstanding items, items still
remain unfinished and takeover procedures cannot be completed
because certain of the outstanding items are essential to permit
the plant to be operated in a safe and proper manner.

In the

face of this, and repeatedly over-running target dates, F have
steadily run down their site establishment and plan to
dis-establish completely at the end of May.

It is clear that in spite of the reasonable notice given and time
allowed by New Zealand Electricity, F have failed to complete the
outstanding items.

Further, it is apparent that the F resources

and contract management procedures are inadequate to ensure that
the remaining work can be completed within a short period.
Having considered the situation, we sent to you, and now confirm
our telex PSS 1680 of 8.5.81.

We therefore confirm that we have given notice in our telex of
8.5.81 that in terms of Clause 12 of the General Conditions of
Contract, F are regarded as being in breach of contract by reason
lack of due diligence and expedition in completing the works, and
failure to comply with instructions to finalise outstanding work
and correct notified defects in readiness for commercial service
of the plant.

The outstanding work to be completed and defects to be rectified
are as previously advised to your site representative by New
Zealand Electricity project staff, and as listed on the attached
schedule.

We further confirm that notice has been given in our telex of
8.5.81 that unless all outstanding work is completed within 20
days from the date thereon, we propose to take the remaining work
out of your hands and have it completed at your cost and using
your equipment, as provided for by the terms and conditions of
Clause 12 of the contract.

Please note that the outstanding work and defects listed in the
attached schedule are required to be completed or corrected as an
integral part of your obligation under the contract and as a
pre-requisite to the issue of any Taking Over Certificate.

Allbook Bindery
91 Ryedale Road
Phone:8076026

